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ABSTRACT 
 
To date, problems in credit rating industry are ubiquitous and rampant. Such a 
phenomenon is especially evident after the outbreak of corporate failures such as Enron’s 
scandal and WorldCom’s collapse. Ever since, there has been the accumulation and 
brewing of voices of concern and criticisms over the incompetence and misconducts of 
credit rating agencies (CRAs). Not until the recent outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
in the US, did people realize the seriousness of domino effects and the global impacts that 
could be generated in the context of globalization and call for the urgent need to cope 
with the agency problem timely and effectively.  
 
The legal status (i.e. the legal position that CRAs have in the society, the rights that CRAs 
possess and the statutes that apply) of CRAs is credited to the recognition of “Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO)” by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The legal liability, however, born by the those NRSROs as 
well as other non-NRSROs had been implicitly yet “automatically” waived by the court 
due to protection by First Amendment and other technically legal reasons. Among the 
cases of litigation against CRAs, whether the court decisions held are equitable, in 
common law, to the plaintiffs is still left to a heated controversy in the society. 
 
Most importantly, beyond pursing and interpreting the legal implications of those 
litigation cases, what is even more critical is to seek solutions aimed directly to the root of 
the problems. Market-based self-regulation approach is regarded to be that critical factor, 
which serves as the backbone of the proposal of solutions. Such an approach, by 
encouraging and advocating competition in the industry, is perceived to be the most 
 VIII 
natural and effective means to rectify agency problems and to foster the development of 
credit rating industry under a “self-regulating” mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
Ever since the evolvement of debt market, there would inevitably exist an understandable 
underlying principle: How do lenders determine the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers and assure themselves of the continued soundness of borrowers after a loan has 
been extended? 1  Although we could not predict the future financial status of the 
borrowers, yet their credit history or the credit reputation, whichever, could be observed 
based on their past repayment records. The current financial status in consideration of the 
borrowers’ incomes, expenses as well as his own assets and liabilities, could also be 
assessed and evaluated as a benchmark to more or less determine their abovementioned 
creditworthiness and financial soundness. Hence, this led to the evolvement of the 
business of credit rating undertaken by those credit rating agencies (CRAs) including 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Fitch Ratings, etc. 
 
As the capital market is growing in scale with a large diversity of bonds and debt 
instruments issued, together with the implementations of Basel I in 19882 and later on 
                                                 
1 White, L.J., The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in Ratings, Rating Agencies 
and the Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. pp. 43. 
2 Carey, M., 2002, A Guide to Choose Absolute Bank Capital Requirements, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 26(5) pp. 929 – 951. 
2 
Basel II3, credit risk has been brought into focus and has become a daunting challenge in 
incomplete and imperfect market. 4  The role of CRAs is becoming more and more 
important than ever. Very often, loan-offering banks and investors rely heavily on the 
credit ratings issued by those rating agencies for their consideration of lending and 
investment purposes. In particular, the National Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs) 5  in the U.S., namely Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 
(“Moody’s”), Standard & Poor’s Division of the McGraw Hill Companies Inc. (“S&P”), 
Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”), Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) and A.M. Best. seemingly 
gain a very high degree of public creditability that their issued credit ratings are faultless 
and convincing under their professional assessment and evaluation. 
 
In recent years, several reports in relation to the CRAs’ activities, role and functions6 
together with their code of conduct7 in the operation of securities markets have been 
issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO). Issues, such as information flow, 
potential conflicts of interest, alleged anticompetitive or unfair practices, and reducing 
potential regulatory barriers to entry have been studied by SEC.8 The assessment criteria, 
decision-making process, the responses to any subtle changes occurred to the objects to 
be rated, the corporate governance, the transparency, the accountability and their legal 
responsibility of those CRAs have been questioned, challenged and criticized by the 
                                                 
3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002, Basel II Accord, Industrial and Financial Systems 
Department. 
4 Prakash, P., 2005, Absolute or Relative? Which standard do Credit Rating Agencies follow?, in Robinson 
College of Business, Georgia State University. 
5 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets. 
6 The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003, Report on 
the activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 
7 The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004, Code of 
Conduct Fundamental for Credit Rating Agencies. 
8 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets. 
3 
public and the financial regulatory bodies. It is without question what there has been an 
increasing awareness aroused in the society. 
Before the outbreak of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis occurred in July in the U.S. (the 
recent collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat9), people had realized the seriousness 
of the issue and pointed their fingers of blame to the subprime-related parties. The causes 
to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis are varied and complex. In accordance with Financial 
Times10, before the credit squeeze, the international financial system enjoyed abundant 
liquidity. Historically low interest rates and the strong economy fuelled the housing boom 
in the U.S. The U.S. home buyers, betting on continued house price appreciation, entered 
the housing markets for the mortgages. Banks and other lenders granted these loans with 
little regard of borrowers’ credit histories. Meanwhile, Wall Street was buying mortgages 
of his own in the form of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). These are pools of 
mortgages and other debts, and were structured to offer savvy investors attractive 
returns.11  
 
Rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s assigned their highest credit ratings 
to some of these CDOs which encouraged pension funds, hedge funds and other 
institutional investors to buy them. But little did these investors know that these CDOs 
weren’t entirely safe as the housing boom in the U.S. cooled and interest rates floated and 
individual borrowers found increasingly difficult to meet their mortgage payment. Many 
of the borrowers during the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, so called the subprime borrowers,  
defaulting on their loans were those with shaky credit histories and often no jobs or 
                                                 
9 The cases in relation to the failure of the Credit Rating Agencies to timely pose a warning signal or alter 
their credit ratings prior to the bankruptcies will be discussed in details in later chapter. 
10 Tett, G., Credit squeeze explained: Launch interactive graphic. September 2007, Financial Times. 
11
 Id. 
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regular income. Rising mortgage defaults undermined the collateral base of the CDOs, 
sending asset values tumbling.12  
 
Hedge funds began to find it more difficult to get finance as Wall Street banks who were 
themselves feeling the pain of credit squeeze became less willing to lend money against 
mortgage securities. This forced hedge funds to sell all manner of assets. Investors in the 
commercial paper market then realized that some of the vehicles which had been issuing 
commercial paper notes might also be holding subprime assets. They panicked and 
stopped buying commercial paper. This hurt financial institutions which relied on 13 
commercial paper for funding such as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), off-
balance-sheet entities which had been widely created by banks in recent years.  
 
Then, even the banks stopped lending to each other. The crisis of liquidity sparked by the 
U.S. housing slump led to a near collapse to the U.K. lender, Northern Rock. The Central 
Bank tried to stop the money market freeze by pumping funds into the system. This 
stopped the panic and slowed down the borrowing but it did not entirely end the senses of 
fear in the funding markets. Back in the U.S., home buyers were squeezed even further. In 
some cases, borrowers were faced with the significant loss of equity as falling house 
prices meant the value of their home was now left with their mortgage repayment.14 The 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis created a globally devastating knock-on effect on various areas 
such as the plunge of stock markets, huge losses suffered by corporations and other 
business entities such as Bank of China, UBS, Merrill Lynch, etc. 
 
                                                 
12
 Tett, G., Credit squeeze explained: Launch interactive graphic. September 2007, Financial Times. 
13 Id. 
14
 Id. 
5 
More importantly, the longsighted, in the first instance, are attempting to find out the 
roots of the problem and attribute them to the loopholes in the rating system and the lack 
of surveillance and transparency of those rating agencies. In addition, there is also an 
urgent need to devise regulations which are explicitly and legally bound to those agencies 
with a reviewing system for amendment and modification in due course. Many 
economists warned that the impacts arisen form the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S. 
are spreading all over the world like plagues devastating the global economy and the U.S. 
economy in long term effects. Up till now, the impacts to the U.S. and the globe, are yet 
to be observed closely by the economists who are deeply concerned about the fact that the 
public may underestimate the adverse effects. Such effects also extend to corporate loss 
causing bankruptcy and layoff of employers, huge drop in retail in the U.S. housing 
market, the U.S. dollar weakness and the worst of all, the great depression in the structure 
of the U.S. economy, which will directly drag down the global economy.  
 
Back to Hong Kong, in accordance with Dai Daohua15, Senior Economist of Bank of 
China (Hong Kong), the rising delinquencies on the subprime mortgages spread rapidly to 
other sectors and markets in July and August 2007, triggering credit crunch and market 
turmoil on the global scale. In light of this, Hong Kong’s economic prospects in the 
second half of 2007 would hinge critically on the evolvement of the subprime crisis and 
its related impacts on various markets. Up to this point, the questions about the 
seriousness and persistency of the subprime turbulence are left without concrete answers. 
The crisis is still evolving. In the worst case scenario, the U.S. economy may slide into 
recession. As a small and open economy, Hong Kong would probably experience slower 
                                                 
15 Dai Daohua, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects amid the Subprime Crisis, Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council, 1st August 2007. 
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growth under the shadow of a slowdown in the U.S., the largest economy in the world 
and the second largest trading partner of Hong Kong.16 
 
On the other hand, one must stay alert that in case the depressed sentiment rooted from 
the subprime crisis is not adequately addressed, global equity, bond and property markets 
would presumably stay volatile, and may eventually head south. Risks from the negative 
wealth effects and backlashes from investors’ sentiment on internal demands should not 
be overlooked.17 The story of the stock market has been indicative of shaking of market 
sentiment and confidence. The big banks such as HSBC and the Bank of China in liaison 
with the purchase of the bundles of those defaulted subprime mortgages suffered, 
dragging down their stock prices appreciably. The Hang Seng index experienced 
thousand point plus daily fluctuations throughout these several months. The volatilities 
were unusually similar to those of emerging markets, suggesting heavy distortion by the 
subprime mortgage crisis. And it remains possible that confidence crisis and fund 
redemption stampede could lead to liquidations by international investors in our market 
despite solid fundamentals.18  
 
The turmoil around the globe poses a warning signal that the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is 
contagious that there might be undiscovered sufferance and loss to be born by the 
commercial banks19, investment banks and the hedge funds which account the major 
investors of those securitized subprime mortgages in the financial market. What is worse, 
the greatest impact stirred by the subprime crisis would be the reduction in the available 
                                                 
16
 Dai Daohua, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects amid the Subprime Crisis, Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council, 1st August 2007. 
17 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19 One of the reasons for the undiscovered loss of the banks is because many such kinds of instruments are 
held by the finance subsidiaries of bank holding companies, off the banks’ balance sheets. 
7 
supply of credit that (i) less credit may be available over a wide range of interest rates
20
 
or (ii) the reduction in credit availability
21 – if one is not oblivious of the credit crisis 
devastating the Japan economy in the 1990s, which has been suffering till now – the 
credit crunch. In the world of globalization, the geographical locations of which the 
counterproductive effects brought by the credit crunch are out of question. Not to mention 
the stock exchange markets, the market sentiment, fear and panic results in severe slash in 
loans by lenders in debt markets, then further housing slump which will hinder consumer 
spending power, and ultimately the economic recession and great depression. They are 
knock-on effects spreading all over the world from sectors to sectors and from countries 
to countries. It is catastrophic. 
 
This purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the role of the CRAs and to define the 
liability of the rating agencies amid the capital market based on the empirical study of the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis. Proactive, responsive and well-prepared approaches are to be 
devised in the sense of crisis consciousness and the future development of credit rating 
business. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
Due to the outbreak of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S., people are increasingly 
worried about the activities involved and the corporate governance of the CRAs as a role 
in the financial market. This dissertation is aimed to serve as an indicator of what the role 
and functions of the CRAs go beyond so far; as a vehicle to determine the liability of the 
                                                 
20 Cantor R. & Wenninger J., 1993, Perspective on the credit slowdown, Quarterly Review, Spring pp. 3 – 
36. 
21
 Id. 
8 
rating agencies in the capital market; as a warning signal to raise public awareness amid 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S.; and as a call for immediate implementation of 
surveillance and explicit legislation.  
 
The objectives of the dissertation are as follows: 
 
1. To identify the current role, legal status22 and functions of CRAs 
2. To study the empirical case “Subprime Mortgage Crisis” in the U.S. 
3. To investigate and identify the cause, impacts and implications of the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis to the global economy 
4. To determine the liability of the rating agencies in the capital market 
5. To critically investigate the loopholes in the rating system 
6. To make suggestions on the preventative measures to be taken and future 
development of the rating agencies 
 
1.3 Scope of Study 
 
Due to the diversity and complexity of the CRAs and their corresponding business areas, 
the dissertation limits the scope of study to Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch which 
are three of the five CRAs of the National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs); their rating activities in the security market in relation to the credit rating 
activities undertaken in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S. 
                                                 
22 For the scope of this dissertation, legal status of Credit Rating Agencies refers to the legal position that 
Credit Rating Agencies have in the society, the rights that Credit Rating Agencies possess and the statutes 
that apply to them and the credit rating industry. Before analyzing the legal issues in relation to Credit 
Rating Agencies, it is crucial to understand the legal status of Credit Rating Agencies; how such a status 
was derived from; to what certain extent of rights Credit Rating Agencies are entitled to have; and what 
statutes and regulations are binding on Credit Rating Agencies. 
9 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology to be adopted in this dissertation is the empirical study of cases to 
discover legal issues. The first empirical case study is the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 
the US, which in itself, derives a lot of legal issues in the financial markets. In order to 
limit the scope of the dissertation, only those which are closely related to credit rating 
industry will be studied. In order to realize the empirical study, the current regulatory 
regime within the credit rating industry in the US will be studied in advance. 
 
Second, past court cases in relation to the lawsuit against the credit rating agencies will be 
studied in details one by one, in terms of the court decisions, legal issues arisen in the 
case, as well as the legal implications deemed necessary to determine the future 
regulatory regime in the credit rating industry. Finally, the result of the empirical study of 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and that of past court cases will be combined, which act as 
the evidence and grounds for the arguments and recommendations set forth at the end of 
this dissertation. 
 
1.5 Structure of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Following this section of introduction, 
chapter two focuses on literature review on credit rating industry ever since its inception 
in human history including the evolvement of CRAs, definition of Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs), the importance of credit ratings,  the role and 
functions of CRAs in the financial market, and criticisms on them. Chapter three reviews 
10 
the credit rating industry and the organizational structure of the CRAs. Chapter four 
brings about the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S., including the cause and the 
impacts of such crisis. Chapter five recognizes the problems in the credit rating industry. 
Chapter six reviews legal issues of credit rating industry, including the current regulatory 
bodies, statutory provisions, and discusses the liability to be born by the CRAs. Chapter 
seven presents with a proposal of regulatory reform with the suggestions for the 
improvement to be adopted by the regulatory bodies in the US as well as in Hong Kong. 
Finally, a conclusive summary of the dissertation and the recommendations for further 
research are given in Chapter eight. 
11 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF 
CREDIT RATING AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
2.1 History of Credit Rating Agency 
 
The existence of credit rating23  and that of CRAs came relatively late in the human 
history. Sylla (2002) articulated the origins of the credit rating and credit rating agency, 
which could be categorized into two major timeframes, namely the ratings agency 
performance, 1909 – 1960s24 and the globalization of credit ratings, 1970s – 2000.25 Sylla 
(2002) first raised out the questions why the bond rating innovation came so late in 
human’s history when Dutch investors had been buying bonds for three centuries, English 
investors for two, and American investors for one century, all the time without the benefit 
of agency ratings. Throughout the four-century history of modern capital markets, at least 
in the cases of Dutch, English and American, most of the bond investing was in the public, 
or sovereign, debts of nations and governments that investors trusted as being willing and 
able to honor their commitments.26 The private and corporation-based investing bonds 
belonged to the minority when compared to those aforementioned government bonds, 
which formed a large pool of investment for the people to put their money in and expect 
the return of interest, or the coupon. It is therefore understandable and reasonable that 
                                                 
23 For the definition of credit rating, please refer to 2.4 of this chapter for further details. 
24 Sylla, R., An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in Ratings, Rating Agencies and the 
Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. pp. 25. 
25 Id. pp.33. 
26 Id. pp.21. 
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bond rating industry could lag behind the financial systems and capital markets at that 
time. Not until the advent of railroads in the late 1820s, the crying capital need of the 
United States during much of the nineteenth century was for funds to build railroads, to 
open up and knit together an economy of continental proportions.27 After 1850, railroad 
corporations grew larger, with enlarged capital needs, and they expanded into unsettled 
and undeveloped territories where there were few local banks and investors willing to 
finance them. The solution to the problem of financing U.S. railroads was the 
development of a huge market, both domestic and international, in the bonded debt of U.S. 
railroad corporations.28 By the time, in 190929, John Moody, who is the founder of the 
Moody’s, began to rate bonds, unfolding the history of bond rating industry in the U.S. 
Sylla (2002) further laid out the drivers that contributed to the innovation of the agency 
ratings: Credit-Reporting Agencies, Specialized Business/Financial Press and Investment 
Bankers. 
 
Credit-Reporting Agencies
30
 
 
While most of the business was carried out locally in early times, the need for information 
on suppliers and customers, which businesspersons had no personal knowledge on 
increased. Early in 1841, Lewis Tappan, a New York dry goods and silk merchant, 
compiled huge amount of records on his customers’ creditworthiness and decided to 
specialize on the provision of commercial information. He founded the Mercantile 
Agency, which generated the revenue by selling such kind of information to the 
                                                 
27 Sylla, R., An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in Ratings, Rating Agencies and the 
Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. pp. 22. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. pp. 23. 
13 
subscribers all over the United States. Later on, as more and more such kind of credit-
reporting agencies were established all over the U.S., the credit-reporting industry was 
transformed into the current credit-rating industry nowadays. 
 
Specialized Business/Financial Press
31
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between U.S. railroad corporations and the bond 
rating industry was intimately bound. By 1832, the railroad industry was reported on by a 
specialized publication, The American Railroad Journal. As soon as Henry Varnum Poor 
(1812 – 1905) became its editor in 1849, the journal came into a publication for investors. 
Right after Henry Poor’s death in 1905 and after John Moody began his ratings of 
railroad bonds in 1909, the Poor company itself entered the bond rating business in 1916. 
The company merged with Standard Statistics, another information and ratings company, 
in 1941, to form Standard & Poor’s (S&P).  
 
Investment Bankers
32
 
 
Sylla (2002) also suggested that investment bankers, the financial intermediaries who 
underwrote, purchased, and distributed the securities from railroad corporations; put their 
reputations (reputational capital) on the line in every such deal. The investment banker 
was the consummate insider. The banker insisted that securities issuers provide all 
relevant information related to company operations on an ongoing basis to him, 
sometimes by insisting that he or his banking associates be given seats on the board of 
                                                 
31 Sylla, R., An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in Ratings, Rating Agencies and the 
Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. pp. 23. 
32 Id. pp.24. 
14 
directors of corporations. In this way, the banker could size up the character of company 
entrepreneurs and managers, and continue to monitor company affairs. 
 
2.2 Globalization of Credit Ratings
33
 
 
Sylla (2002) proposed that the early development of the business of credit ratings was 
more or less similar to the U.S. development. It was due to the fact that under the 
development of large-scale railroad in the U.S., a significantly massive corporate bond 
market evolved which was much larger than anywhere else in the world, not to mention 
the rapidly growing state and local bond market.34 The rapid growth of U.S. credit ratings 
business was also fuelled by two additional drivers35. The first one was attributed to the 
rapid growth of firms in industries other than railroad sector.36 Those firms, particularly 
public utility and the manufacturing, pursued the access to the bond markets. The second 
one stemmed from massive demand by the U.S. investors, who formed a largely potential 
market of people with rising average levels of income and wealth.37 To put it simply, both 
supply and demand market played their role to contribute the rapid expansion of the credit 
ratings market in the U.S. in the period of 1970s – 2000.  
 
During the period of 1914 – 1918, the Great War, as commented by Sylla (2002), the U.S. 
replaced the Great Britain as the global financial center38, where most of the financial 
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trades and dealings were concentrated. The central bank of the U.S., Federal Reserve, was 
established in 1913, into which its duties fall39: 
 
• Conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit 
conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates40 
• Supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of 
consumers41 
• Maintaining the stability of the financial system and  containing systemic risk that 
may arise in financial markets42 
• Providing financial services to depositary institutions, the U.S. government, and 
foreign official institutions, including playing a major role in operating the 
nation’s payments system43 
 
Investors at that time purchased a lot of government bonds from the Federal Reserve, 
which, after the Great War during 1920s, paid back a large amount of money to the 
investors who later on utilized the money to reinvest. Since then, the demand for the high 
quality of bond ratings for investment grew and was therefore addressed by the bond 
ratings agencies.44  Such a demand together with their reputational capital even grew 
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within the financial regulatory authorities, which, by 1930s, incorporated rating agency 
ratings into their regulations.45  
 
With regard to the globalization of the credit rating industry, Basel II, a revision on the 
rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord set up by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), expedited the development and the widespread use of CRAs and the 
credit ratings thereof. Basel II stipulated various approaches46 such as Basic Indicator 
Approach (BIA), 47  Standardized Approach (SA), 48  and Advanced Measurement 
Approach (AMA)49  to calculate the capital charge of banks. Basel II also associated 
banks’ regulatory capital more intimately with their corresponding risks both assessed 
internally and externally. The dependence of the credit risk weights for each supervisory 
category on “external credit assessments” refers to the outsourcing of credit risk 
assessment by the NRSROs. Under such circumstances, the blossom of credit rating 
industry has since been further boosted by the implementation of Basel II. 
 
2.3 Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
50
 
 
The term “Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations” – NRSRO 51  was originally 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1975 solely for use in 
determining capital charges on different grades of debt securities under Exchange Act 
                                                 
45 For further details of regulations and legal issues with regard to rating agencies, please refer to chapter 3. 
46 Various approaches will not be explained in details due to the scope of the dissertation. 
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17 
Rule 15c31, the Commission’s “net capital rule”.52 As for the Credit Rating Agency Act 
of 2006, it also provides all sorts of criteria to be qualified to become NRSRO.53 Despite 
the initial narrowness of the purpose it served, the designation of NRSRO now becomes 
the universally-accepted benchmark for investment quality, and has been incorporated 
into over 100 federal laws and 50 regulations in the U.S.54 One remarkable example is the 
incorporation of credit rating into the regulations, which will be mentioned later on.  
 
At that time, when NRSRO ratings were first incorporated in the net capital rule, the 
Commission staff determined that the ratings of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch were used 
nationally, and that the staff would raise no questions if these firms were utilized as 
NRSROs for purposes of the net capital rule. 55  Later on, the SEC released several 
interpretation of concepts of NRSROs in 1994,  1997, and on June 4, 2003 at which the 
2003 NRSRO Concept Release was published, addressing issues identified in the Report 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 such as the role of CRAs, their importance to the 
securities markets, impediments faced by CRAs in performing the role, measures to 
improve information flow to the market from CRAs, barriers to entry into the credit rating 
business, and conflicts of interest faced by CRAs.56 
 
Sylla (2002) further raised out the proposition of explaining ratings agencies is that they 
help to resolve conflicts of interest that might exist among the owners of financial assets, 
the institutions that guarantee the assets, the public and private institutions that guarantee 
                                                 
52 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005, Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization. 
53 For details, please refer to S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec. 3(a)(62). 
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55 See, e.g., Letter from Gregory C. Yadley, Staff Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to 
Ralph L. Gosselin, Treasurer, Coughlin & Co., Inc. (November 24, 1975). 
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the assets, and the asset managers that act as agents for the principals or owners.57 Such a 
proposition appears to be the probable approach to explain credit ratings industry in the 
old days, yet the fulfillment of those guarantees mentioned above is always questioned by 
the public nowadays.  
 
Cantor & Packer (1994)58 commented the present SEC’s procedures and conditions for 
the designation of agencies to be qualified to be NRSROs is not explicit and often causes 
confusion to the public. In accordance with the report released by SEC59, the division 
believes the paramount criteria to become the NRSRO is to be “recognized by the 
predominant users of ratings in the United States as issuer of credible and reliable 
ratings”.  
 
The evolvement and development of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, however, make the entry barrier of qualification even impossible for other 
credit agencies to pass. In a speech conducted on 3rd March 2005 discussing the NRSRO 
proposal, Cynthia A. Glassman, commissioner of U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, pointed out that rating agencies cannot be an NRSRO unless their ratings 
are nationally recognized. There existed a contradiction that those agencies cannot 
achieve national recognition without being recognized by the SEC staff as an NRSRO, a 
classic “chicken and egg” problem. The problems evolved in the credit rating industry 
will be discussed thoroughly later on in this chapter. 
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2.4 Definition of Credit Rating 
 
Ever since the development of credit rating industry, there have been many explanations 
of the term credit rating, including the interpretation of S&P, that of BIS, and that of Frost 
(2006). The Credit Rating Agency Act of 2006 provides the authoritative definition of 
credit rating “an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with 
respect to specific securities or money market instruments”.
60
 S&P defines credit rating 
as S&P (generally speaking, all CRAs’) opinions of the general creditworthiness of an 
obligor, or the creditworthiness of an obligor, or the creditworthiness of an obligor with 
respect to a particular debt security or other financial obligation, based on relevant risk 
factors.61 The credit ratings are typically based on both public and private information, 
with the exception of unsolicited ratings62, which are based on public information only. 
The credit rating does not constitute a recommendation to purchase, sell, or hold a 
particular security. Also, a rating does not comment on the suitability of an investment for 
a particular investor.63  Frost (2006) spelt out the definition of credit rating: a rating 
agency’s credit quality assessment of a debt issuer or a specific debt obligation.
64
 A 
report written by joint efforts of a group of European Central Bank experts introduced 
that the ratings provided by CRAs are an indication of long-term fundamental credit 
strength of companies65 and also addressed that the purpose served for using ratings is to 
achieve information economies of scale and to solve principal-agent problems. 66  To 
constrain behaviour, regulators (in regulations), banks and bondholders (in loan and bond 
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covenants), pension fund trustees and other fiduciary agents (in investment guidelines, 
insurance company charters, etc) have increasingly employed ratings-based criteria.67 
 
A credit rating is assigned both with a letter rating (credit category) and commentary (if 
provided). 68  The commentary can include a “credit watch” and/or “credit outlook” 
modifier, assumptions, criteria, and methods used in determining the rating opinion, 
conditions under which the rating may or will be changed, and descriptions of the rated 
company and its lines of business.69 Moreover, credit ratings also guide the market’s 
pricing decisions. 70  Precisely speaking, since the credit rating is both expert and 
independent, it is a valuable complement to an investor’s own credit analysis.71 Table 2.1 
shows various categories of credit ratings issued by major CRAs and their corresponding 
definitions. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of various categories of credit ratings 
 
Source: Richard S. Wilson and Frank J. Fabozzi, Corporate Bonds: Structure and Analysis (New Hope, PA: 
Frank J. Fabozzi Associates, 1996 
 
The purpose of credit ratings is to measure, in terms of probability of default, the credit 
risk, expected losses or the probability of timely payments in accordance with contractual 
terms. 72  As such, the credit rating, notwithstanding the fact that it is assigned in 
accordance with the aforementioned letter rating system, possesses certain implications 
itself such as financial strength, franchise value, management quality and competitive 
position in its industry under a range of macroeconomic and credit conditions, including 
stress conditions, which altogether – public information and private/confidential 
information which companies agree to share with CRAs – are also the set of information 
that CRAs base their analyses on.73 The details of each of the aforementioned analysis 
criteria will be further discussed in later chapters. 
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The abovementioned European Central Bank report also attributed two critical functions 
of credit ratings to the growing popularity of the ratings: a). information economics of 
scale and b). solution to principal-agent problems 
 
Information economics of scale
74
 
 
The economics of scale in gathering and analyzing information appeals to the creditors 
and investors who found it efficient to manipulate the opinions derived from the ratings in 
initiating and monitoring their transactions. On the other hand, the benefits brought about 
from the economics of scale also favor the borrowers to debt the market, which are three-
fold: 
 
• Widen the investor pool 
• Reduce adverse selection problems resulting from information asymmetries 
between investors and issuers of debt 
• Provide sufficient impetus to development of financial market 
 
Solution to principal-agent problems
75
 
 
Under the circumstances of asymmetric information in the financial market, the principal-
agent problem definitely evolves whenever a principal (debt issuers, bond investors, 
portfolio managers, etc.) hires an agent (credit rating agents). In order to be able to 
monitor and constrain the actions of agents, the principal will formulate a simple and 
                                                 
74 Gonzalez F., Haas F., Johannes R., Persson M., Toledo L., Violi R., Wieland M. & Zins C., 2004, Market 
Dynamics Associated with Credit Ratings: A Literature Review, European Central Bank. 
75
 Id. 
23 
verifiable rule with low transaction costs.76 The report published by European Central 
Bank also highlighted the importance of credit ratings where are used to solve principal-
agent problems. At the time when it is hard to monitor or directly have control over the 
actions conducted by the CRAs, the principal will maximize incentives for agents to 
perform well.77 
 
2.5 Uses of Credit Rating  
 
Before investigating the role of CRAs in financial markets, it is necessary to understand 
and differentiate the importance of credit rating from that of CRAs, which could be 
categorized into three facets of uses, namely the intrinsic use, traditional use and modern 
use. The intrinsic use articulates the author’s definitions and viewpoints towards the 
significance of credit ratings in the sense of a more general way. As for the traditional use 
and modern use of credit rating, its specific applications on various uses in financial 
markets are to be spelt out. 
 
Intrinsic Use 
 
The credit ratings assigned by all the CRAs are meant to indicate the likelihood of default 
or delayed payment of the security. The importance of credit rating is to indicate the 
performance of the company and to compare the company’s credit worthiness against 
other company’s in similar markets or industries worldwide. 78  Furthermore, it also 
indicates how a company is anticipated to perform in the future and whether it could meet 
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its capacity to settle its debt and satisfy its overall financial obligations.79 In fact, credit 
rating can be treated as one of underlying fundamentals of a company reviewing its 
capability in respect to its overall performance as a reference of building up in confidence 
among investors and shareholders. 
 
Traditional Use
80
 
 
Cantor & Packer (1994) classified the traditional aspect of credit rating into three aspects. 
The first one is to distinguish the bonds of investment grade (credit rating is BBB- or 
higher by Standard & Poor’s, i.e. ‘AAA’, ‘AA’, ‘A’, ‘BBB’81  or Baa3 or higher by 
Moody’s82) from speculative grade (Debt rated ‘BB’ or below by Standard & Poor’s). 
Throughout the history, based on the distinction between the investment grade and 
speculative grade securities, the demand for the credit ratings as well as the growth of the 
credit rating industry have since expanded. At the time of issuing new regulatory 
restrictions on investment, numerous financial regulatory institutions perceived 
investment grade as a threshold to be satisfied in order to prove to be financially sound 
and justified. In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for 
International Settlements recognized the associated credit risk is the equivalent of 
investment grade or better83, signifying the importance of investment grade. Secondly, the 
distinction between investment grade and speculative grade eases the burden of issuer of 
securities to disclose the full set of company information at issuance for investment grade 
securities.  
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Modern Use 
84
 
 
Cantor & Packer (1994) commented that the new regulatory use appears to have 
encouraged other regulations to expand their reliance on ratings, and summarized selected 
uses of credit ratings in U.S. regulation. In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the Secondary 
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA) to promote the development of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS).85 In addition to creating the non-agency MBS market, SMMEA 
established a new regulatory cutoff rating: the higher AA rating was chosen. The Federal 
Reserve Board, after several years, expanded it use of ratings beyond the basic investment 
grade and began to incorporate an AA cutoff for determining the eligibility of mortgage-
related securities (1987) and foreign bonds (1989).86 After the enactment of the U.S. 
Congress, there have been many other financial regulatory bodies which are continuously 
drafting and amending their existing regulatory restrictions on the basis of varying the 
requirement of credit rating. 
 
To date, Credit ratings together with their corresponding opinions are assigned to profit-
making corporate entities, public financial institutions (such as municipal and state 
governments), non-profit organizations, national governments, and also to specific fixed 
payment obligations undertaken by these entities (generally debt and preferred stock), and 
to structured financial products (synthetic investment instruments such as collateralized 
debt obligations, CDO and asset backed securities, ABS).87 
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2.6 Relative Rating vs. Absolute Rating
88
 
 
Although the purpose of this dissertation is not to analyze the mechanisms employed by 
the CRAs to issue the credit ratings, the underlying meaning of the credit ratings issued is 
to be studied since more and more investors have been starting to doubt their credit rating 
standard that whether the rating issued is a relative rating or absolute rating, which 
certainly differs with each other significantly. Prakash (2005) pointed that little academic 
work has been done to investigate of the standards those credit rating agencies employ to 
assign credit ratings to individual firms. 89  Prakash (2005) addressed two problems 
evolved about the standard of credit ratings: How do objective measures adopted in 
assessing the credit ratings correlate with individual approaches of those Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs)? What is the determinant of 
rating standards? Those two questions hook themselves with quantative issues which 
were studied thoroughly by Prakash (2005), who concluded that ratings do not reflect an 
unconditional probability of default; instead, they only reflect a conditional likelihood of 
default.90 
 
To date, in the common practices of credit rating, the accuracy on relative and absolute 
are presumed on current uses of the ratings. Cantor & Packer (1994) also portrayed the 
risks of corporate bond defaults in relative and absolute term. They pointed out that 
ratings, at a minimum level, shall provide a reasonable rank-ordering of relative credit 
risks.91 However, a reliable guide to absolute credit risk shall also be provided by the 
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ratings.92 Based on their findings and analysis of the corporate bond defaults, it showed 
that the CRAs performed relatively well in offering relative ratings, but not absolute 
ratings. Yet, it should be noted that such a result was deduced from the set of data of 
corporate bond ratings, excluding commercial paper ratings, municipal bond ratings, or 
asset-backed bonds. 
 
2.7 Role of CRAs in financial markets 
 
Generally speaking, the role of CRAs have been addressed by numerous authors, who 
have a spectrum of viewpoints and perceptions on what the CRAs can bring to both the 
financial markets and the investors as well as their functions. Financial institutions such 
as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released reports addressing issues about rating agencies 
and their use under the Federal Securities Laws. In accordance with the report released by 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions, CRAs assess the credit risk of 
corporate or government borrowers and issuers of fixed-income securities. 93  CRAs 
attempt to make sense of the vast amount of information available regarding an issuer or 
borrower, its market and its economic circumstances in order to give investors and 
lenders a better understanding of the risks they face when lending to a particular borrower 
or when purchasing an issuer’s fixed-income securities.94 In particular, the report also 
addresses what exactly CRAs do: CRAs provide services to both investors and issuers by 
readdressing some of the information asymmetry so they help investors better understand 
the uncertainties and risks they face when making an investment in a given debt security, 
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while lowering the costs of raising capital for investors.95 In addition, CRAs also play an 
important role in the relationship among investors (including institutional lenders) and 
issuers and contribute to the market’s overall understanding of the vast amount of raw 
data that investors will wish to digest in order to make informed decisions.96 
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also contributed to articulate the 
role of CRAs in financial markets. Such a role and functioning of the CRAs were 
formulated by collecting opinions from representatives of rating agencies on the general 
description of their business. CRAs generally view their role as assessing the 
creditworthiness of issuers on an ongoing basis, and the likelihood that debt will be repaid 
in a timely manner.97 At the same time, they emphasized that they did not conduct any 
formal audits of rated companies or search for fraud, and that the nature of their analysis 
is largely dependent on the quality of information provided to them.98 In particular, those 
representatives felt that the credit ratings were critical to the enactment of the 
Commission’s rules in regulating money market funds, which is in line with what Cantor 
& Packer (1994) mentioned as the reliance of U.S. regulation on credit ratings.  
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2.8 Key Assets of CRAs: Reputation 
 
Smith & Walter proposed that a reputation for technical competence, continuity, 
transparency, objectivity and impartiality99 is the essence of the principal asset of the 
rating agencies. There will be no justifiable demand the ratings without such a reputation. 
Smith & Walter also reckoned that the defined reputation also provides a floodgate 
preventing the exploitation of any potential conflicts of interest100 in the rating business, 
which will be discussed in later chapter. In discussing the benefits to the CRAs of 
increased disclosure, Frost (2006) also pointed out that stronger reputation and credibility 
are one of the benefits that CRAs always cherish. A report published by European Central 
Bank also mentioned that reputation is all-important101 to CRAs. 
 
In the report issued by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission discussing the role and 
functions of CRAs, it addressed that the rating agencies take the position that their 
reputation for issuing objective and credible ratings is of paramount importance, and that 
they would be unwilling to put the reputation in jeopardy to mollify a particular issuer or 
allow issuers to improperly influence their ratings or by otherwise failing to be diligent 
and objective in their rating assessments. 102  In addition, the rating agencies put 
reputational concerns to their priority that they will exercise all appropriate levels of 
diligence in the rating process to safeguard their reputation.103 
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Covitz & Harrison (2003) from Federal Reserve Board, in their paper, addressed that 
issue and importance of reputation to CRAs, and proposed two hypotheses: “the conflict 
of interest hypothesis”104 of issuer interests and “reputation hypothesis”105 of investor 
interests, which are countervailing with each other and had long been the dilemma among 
the CRAs. Covitz and Harrison (2003) concluded that the analysis indicated that the 
reason for those CRAs which act responsively in the interest of investors in the market is 
due to reputation concerns106, instead of the true concern of investors’ interest, which 
implied that if reputation is not a problem of concern to them, they are prone to act in the 
interest of issuers.  
 
2.9 Criticisms of CRAs 
 
In recent history of the development of CRAs, there have been many complaints and 
criticisms on the code of conduct of CRAs, their released credit ratings, their conflicting 
role in the financial market and the regulatory regime, and so forth.  There is, however, a 
lack of empirical evidence supporting the above-mentioned criticisms, which can only be 
based on several past cases such as Enron107 in December, 2001. Frost (2006) highlighted 
three reasons for the absence of strong empirical evidence: first, it is difficult to develop 
any powerful tests in relation to the potential conflicts of interest and alleged unfair 
practices; second, no empirical researches, so far, have investigated the criticisms 
associated with the adequacy of the CRAs’ disclosure practices; third, the focus of the 
adequacy of CRAs’ disclosure practices, diligence, and competence are mainly based on 
the subjective benchmarks which are extremely difficult to quantify and are questionable 
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themselves.108 Among many research papers written so far, CRAs in Capital Markets: A 
Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of The Agencies written by Carol 
Ann Frost portrayed the whole picture of the criticisms amid the rating industry with a 
detailed explanation on the every criticism extracted from Report on the Role and 
Functioning of CRAs in the Operation of Securities Markets produced by U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission.  
 
The technical committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) together with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued quite a number 
of reports and articles in relation with the code of conducts and activities about the CRAs 
such as Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs, Report on the Activities of CRAs by  
IOSCO, and Report on the Role and Function of CRAs in the Operation of the Securities 
Markets (SEC 2003a), Concept Release: Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings 
under the Federal Securities Laws (SEC 2003c), Definition of Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (SEC 2005b), and The Final Rule of Oversight of CRAs 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (SEC 2007b). 
 
Partnoy (2001) argued that despite the fact that the CRAs have been sued after a series of 
defaults which are enumerated in his paper, the agencies could still escape from legal 
liability based on the arguments that the credit ratings are privilege speech in the United 
States and they are extensively disclaimed but not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold 
securities.109 It seems that the CRAs do not face substantial litigation risk110 although they 
are frequently sued as a matter of course. 
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2.9.1 Problems in Disclosure Practices 
 
Frost (2006) spelt out three key concerns with respect to the disclosure practices: 1). 
failure to disclose information pertinent to their procedures adequately; 2). material 
information was selectively disclosed to the subscribers and 3). confidential information 
about the entities they rate was carelessly disclosed. 111  The problem in disclosure 
practices was also addressed in SEC 2003a that there should be improvements to the 
extent and quality of disclosure by issuers112 (including disclosures in relation to ratings 
triggers113).  
 
2.9.2 Lack of Competition  
 
A report of United States Senate, called “Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up 
the Credit Rating Cartel”, described the current credit rating industry as a duopoly114, 
where there is a lack of competition, no substitutable goods, high rates of profitability, 
and price-setting behaviour. The market of duopoly is dominated by S&P and Moody’s, 
which control over 80% of the credit rating industry.115 The factors contributing to the 
duopoly market are two-fold. Firstly, in accordance with Nazareth (2003), the large CRAs 
employed several certain unproven aggressive practices to uphold their position and 
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112 U.S. Securities and Commission Exchange, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies 
in the Operation of Securities Markets, January 2003. 
113 A rating trigger is a contractual provision, adopted in credit agreements and bond indentures, which 
provided lenders with specific rights whenever a borrower’s credit ratings decline to a certain level. Please 
refer to Frost (2006) for further details. 
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dominance in the market.116 Secondly, the lacking competition within the credit rating 
industry is also attributed to high entry barrier with the requirements to be fulfilled to be 
the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization with high recognition and 
reputation, which make it virtually impossible for other rating agencies to compete with 
the incumbent NRSROs.  
 
2.9.3 Conflict of Interests
117
 
 
With respect to the conflict of interests, Frost (2006) highlighted the conflicting role 
CRAs bear as soon as they charge the bond issuers rating fees and simultaneously 
undergo credit rating process for the bonds. There is a high alleged tendency for the 
CRAs to release higher credit rating in return for higher rating fees, which twists and goes 
beyond the principle and the purpose served by credit ratings. In addition, Frost (2006) 
further argued that the ancillary advisory services provided by the CRAs to the bond 
issuers also contributed to the charges of the conflict of interest. Such advisory services 
include customized credit risk management services 118 , asset allocation, portfolio 
strategies, fund research and recommendations, and so on. As long as those CRAs are 
involved in the advisory services provided with to bond issuers and its clients, the role of 
gatekeeper as a third person in the financial market would be suspected with the public. 
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2.9.4 Lack of Transparency 
 
Kyl J., Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee pointed out that the determinations 
made by the CRAs are in secret and divergent in the nature and extent of information 
made available to the public. 119  The depth of the credit ratings ranges from 
comprehensive, lengthy research reports detailing rating methodology to a summary of 
the credit ratings released.120  
 
2.9.5 Diligence and Competence
121
 
 
In Frost’s paper, there is a large coverage on the practices of the CRAs during their 
assessment of credit ratings such as 1) the failure to raise probing questions of the 
company management; 2) lack of effective use of their special access to confidential 
information provided Regulation Fair Disclosure 122  to unravel the truth about the 
companies they rate; 3) release inadequate warning of failures; and 4) fail to timely and 
high quality information to financial markets.  
 
Frost further concluded that there is a growing trend of research undertaken such as 
Ashbaugh, Collins & LaFond (2004), motivated by recent high-profile cases of corporate 
fraud, discussing the effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings, as well as 
Boot, Milbourn & Schmeits (2006) discussing the credit ratings as coordination 
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mechanisms in the financial markets. All the researches done so far paved the way to 
address the policy issues in relation to the CRAs.123 
 
2.9.6 Issue of Accountability 
 
The accountability born by those CRAs throughout the history of credit rating is proven 
to be rather weak as those NRSROs had been, to certain extent, protected under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration 
Statement)124 from severely potential liability. Sack & Juris (2007) enumerated a list of 
law cases of the litigation in the past with regard to the civil liability of the rating 
agencies, such as Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs. Inc., 125  County of 
Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos.,126 Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs. 
Inc.,127 and Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos.128 The decisions held by the court for all of the 
aforementioned cases were either that the claims for the breach of contract, defamation, 
negligent misrepresentation, etc. were waived due to the lack of sufficient evidence 
deemed necessary to be provided by the plaintiff or that the settlement for the claims were 
mitigated and reduced to a negligible sum of monetary compensation paid by the 
CRAs.129 
 
Rousseau (2005) argued that there is a deficiency of mechanisms which are designed to 
offset the market failures such as the imperfect competition and agency problems in credit 
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rating industry, and to ensure the accountability of the CRAs in response to the issuers as 
well as the investors.130 He also put further the existence of a term called “accountability 
gap” which results in an imbalance between CRAs’ power, and the possibility of holding 
them responsible for their use or even abuse of the power.131 Rousseau finally concluded 
to urge that the CRAs, through the implementation of the IOSCO Code, are required to 
disclose their codes of conduct to the public and reveal to the investors how their 
provisions meet the requirement of the IOSCO Code of Conduct.132  
 
Remarkably, the latest development of the credit rating reform is the implementation of 
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006133 (Rating Agency Act), enacted on 29th 
September 2006, is to enhance the quality of the credit ratings in order to safeguard the 
investors and the public interest. It is to ensure that the accountability, transparency, and 
competition134  as well as the independence can be maintained and upheld within the 
credit rating industry. In particular, the release of the Final Rule of SEC 2007b, Oversight 
of CRAs Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations was also 
based on the aforementioned Rating Agency Act to further clarify issues in relation to the 
CRAs such as the registration requirements of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs), statistics of credit ratings performance, procedures and 
methodologies employed in determining credit ratings, procedures to prevent the misuse 
of non-public information, code of ethics, conflicts in interests, and so forth. The Final 
Rule released by Securities and Exchange Commission provided with a thorough 
explanation and clarification of many previously ambiguous terms and misunderstood 
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concepts prevailed in credit rating industry, and additionally, demonstrated the SEC’s 
monitoring and regulating role within the credit rating industry.  
 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
 
After reviewing the history of evolvement of credit rating business, a deeper 
understanding towards the credit rating industry is thus developed. Not until the 
enactment of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (Rating Agency Act), was there 
any clear definition of “credit rating” and “NRSRO”. Rating Agency Act authoritatively 
defines “credit rating” as “an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity 
or with respect to specific securities or money market instruments” 135 ; defines and 
stipulates the requirement to apply for “NRSRO”.136 Credit rating can be classified into 
intrinsic use, traditional use and modern use. Reputation is identified to be the key asset 
of CRAs. Lastly, criticisms over the CRAs are reviewed and identified.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY AND  
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF  
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
While the preceding chapter facilitates the conceptual understanding of credit rating 
industry, this chapter fosters the realization of such concepts in practice. Although 
different CRAs have different credit rating assessment, process and procedures, all of 
them share, to certain extent, the same group of clients/interest parties, organizational 
structure in terms of corporate governance, implications of the released credit ratings, 
surveillance and review mechanism of the credit ratings. This chapter looks into the 
outlook of credit rating industry and, by taking all of the aforementioned into account, 
investigates Moody’s, S&P and Fitch in a comparative approach. 
 
3.2 Interested Parties of Credit Ratings 
 
Traditionally speaking, the credit rating, which served its own purposes137 to the bond 
issuers and the investors, was deemed seemingly as a “communication bridge” 
established between the issuers and investors, which allowed the latter party to lend their 
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money under certain amount of interest (coupon payment) to the former party by 
purchasing the bonds with confidence expressed by the letter-ratings released to the 
market. As the development of financial and derivative market grow mature, more and 
more interested parties are involved and establish relationships and put much dependence 
on the credit ratings. The growing demand for credit ratings promoted the use of credit 
ratings to the extent that even the regulators have long been devising the ratings-based 
regulatory constraints138 alongside the development of financial market. It even comes to 
a perception that credit ratings are more or less equivalent to benchmarks or 
creditworthiness standards,139  which is much far beyond their original purpose to be 
served. 
 
Debt and Bond Issuers
140
 
 
Besides having impact on the marketability, credit default swaps141, bond yields and bond 
prices142, what debt issuers mostly are concerned is about the impact to the confidence of 
the public generated by the credit ratings. Very often, when the credit ratings of a 
particular bond is lowered from investment grade to speculative grade by CRAs, the 
credibility of the bond issuer as well as the confidence of the investors will be shaken 
with no questions, followed by rating trigger under severe circumstances. Rating trigger 
is the inclusion of a covenant specifying an early payment to bondholders when the debt 
is downgraded to a certain level.143 Rating triggers, which were primarily stipulated in 
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bank loan covenants, increasingly gained popularity and were diversified in bond 
issuance in the mid to late 1990s.144 The collapse in confidence among bond investors 
triggers off a series of domino effects on the contraction of investment and further lending, 
and aggravates the liquidity of the bond issuer, and the worst of all, ends up in bankruptcy 
of the company.  
 
The report published by European Central Bank145 highlighted the importance of credit 
ratings that they helped bond issuers to determine their financing costs as well as the 
quality of their investor bases. Many financial institutions and organizations incorporate 
the attainment of certain credit rating into their corporate goals, targets and strategies. The 
2008/09 – 2010/11 Service Plan published by Ministry of Finance from British Columbia 
regarded maintaining the credit ratings to be “Aaa” by Moody’s Investor Service as the 
performance measure under their targets.  
 
Bond Investors & Portfolio Managers
146
 
 
Credit ratings provide investors with a general idea of the investing company’s 
creditworthiness and its repaying capacity. According to Ellis (1997) and Baker & Mansi 
(2002), however, bond investors’ viewpoints on credit ratings released by the CRAs are 
quite different from that of bond issuers. Ellis discovered the difference of viewpoints on 
credit ratings between bond investors and issuers.147 A large majority of the former party 
require only one rating, usually from those highly recognized NRSROs, whereas the latter 
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party prefers to obtain credit ratings from three or more CRAs.148 After surveying the 
chief financial officers (CFOs) from 200 investor-owned utilities and 400 institutional 
fixed-income investors, he summarized that investors are more than eager to learn any 
subtle changes suffered by the issuers and hence are prone to expect the credit ratings to 
be updated immediately, if any. The divergence in expectations of issuers and investors is 
due to the difference in their interests. One remarkable point is that investors tend to rely 
on the rating agencies that they feel to be the most accurate and consistent.149 
 
The use of credit ratings is broadly adopted by credit portfolio managers, portfolio 
managers, quantitative analysts, asset managers, risk controllers and the like. This is 
especially true when the asset managers from small to medium-sized enterprises do not 
have sufficient resources to develop their own internal credit assessment systems, 
whereas even the major asset managers treat the released credit ratings as a supplement to 
their own internal ratings, and any discrepancy between both ratings will trigger their 
alertness.150 
 
Other Participants in the Market
151
 
 
Other market participants such as market makers, or broker-dealers, also connect 
themselves with external ratings for the assessment for their own investment portfolios as 
well as their trading counterparties. Credit ratings are crucial indicators to short-term 
management of liquidity and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative trading. Besides 
managing their own portfolios and implementing monetary policies, many central banks 
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rely on the credit ratings which are incorporated in the definition of eligible assets and are 
one of the critical elements determining their sovereign bond spreads.152 
 
Regulators 
 
According to Cantor & Packer (1994), the dependence on credit ratings extends to nearly 
all financial regulators, such as the public authorities that oversee banks, thrifts, insurance 
companies, securities firms, capital markets, mutual funds, and private pensions.153 The 
applications of ratings on regulatory restrictions include regulatory capital requirements, 
disclosure requirements, and investment prohibitions.154The latest application of credit 
ratings on regulations is the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.155 In December 
2004, the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions also released a set of guidelines and code of conducts that the CRAs shall 
follow in practice.156 In later chapters, there will be thorough discussion on the fulfillment 
of certain terms and guidelines stipulated in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 
and the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs respectively. The adoption of credit 
ratings is also widely used by the Basel II, in which the risk weights depend on the 
external rating grade in the Ratings-Based Approach (RBA).157  Table 3.2 shows the 
various risk weights for the different external rating categories in the RBA. 
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Table 3.2 Risk weights of external ratings in RBA 
 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (A Revised Framework), Bank for International 
Settlements, 2004. 
 
3.3 Study of Fee Structures 
 
White (2001) argued in his paper that Moody’s and S&P are not charging sufficiently 
high fees in order to maximize their profits.158 In accordance with the law of demand and 
supply, if the rating fees are escalated by the rating agencies, the demand by issuers will 
be reduced as a result, and vice versa. White pointed out that there is still room for both 
Moody’s and S&P to increase their fees until reaching the standard monopoly 
maximizing point.
159
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P is the price charged by the monopolist 
MC is the monopolist’s marginal costs 
E is the elasticity of the demand curve facing the monopolist 
 
Source: White L.J., The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in Ratings, Rating 
Agencies and the Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp.59 
 
The fact that those CRAs have not been raising their fees to the level as mentioned is 
explained by White in four possible reasons. The first reason White proposed was the 
possibility of a sharp distortion in the demand curve where the increase in the fees 
charged will be offset by the decrease in issuance costs.160  The second one was the 
consequence of price competition that one of the CRAs may end up losing too much in 
rating fees if it initiates a price rise while the others do not follow.161 The third one was 
that the actual price paid by the issuers is actually lower than the designated listing price 
schedule due to the result of negotiation of prices between the issuers and the CRAs.162 
The last reason that White (2001) put forth was that the unwillingness of rating agencies 
to see the request for the ratings they issued dropped to a certain extent that their 
reputation may be endangered even though they can still keep on rating those unsolicited 
debt securities.163  
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3.4 Fees of CRAs 
 
The structure of fee charged undertook a great change since the early 1970s, which was 
due to the spread of low-cost photocopying which resulted in large publication of the 
information of credit ratings.164 As the ease of getting hold of that public information was 
reduced, more and more people (as White called them “free-riders”) were able to get hold 
such information without paying to the CRAs. Moreover, on the other hand, the liquidity 
crisis by other short-term issuers following the default by the Penn Central on $82 million 
commercial paper aroused the sense of crisis among investors who called for the quality 
and the guaranteed credit ratings to be issued to the issuers.165 Under such circumstances, 
the credit rating industry was boosted rapidly and the structure of fee charged changed 
from subscribers-based to issuers-based and derived mostly from solicited ratings.  
 
Revenue 
 
Expectedly, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”), Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 
and Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”) mainly derive their revenue from issuer payments for credit 
rating. In particular, Moody’s and S&P dominate the credit rating market with a 
combined 80% market share.166 Under such circumstance, a market of duopoly167 has 
been created. As for Moody’s and S&P’s remaining part of the revenue, it is mainly 
derived from the sales of the credit research, data products and ancillary services.168 
                                                 
164  White L.J., The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in Ratings, Rating 
Agencies and the Global Financial System, Richard M. Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, Carmen Reinhart, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp.47 
165
 Id. 
166 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
167 Id. 
168 The details of the ancillary services of Moody’s and S&P will be discussed later in this chapter. 
46 
Unlike Moody’s and S&P, Fitch does not provide any advisory services to issuers.169 Up 
to this point, to a very large extent, Fitch “segregates” itself from a position in which 
alleged conflicts of interest abound.  
 
Fee Schedule 
 
The fee schedules summarize their fee structures and ranges, which are provided to the 
issuers. There is a lower and upper limit for the fee charged for the Moody’s rating 
services, of which the former is US$1,500 and the latter is US$2,400,000.170 With respect 
to S&P, the fees generally vary from US$2,000 to over US$1,500,000.171 As for Fitch, 
generally, the lowest charge of fee for issuer credit ratings is USD1,000; whereas the 
highest charge of fee is USD750,000,172 which is much less significant when compared 
with Moody’s and S&P. In certain cases, on the other hand, all or a number of issued by a 
particular issuer, or insured or guaranteed by a particular insurer or guarantor will be 
rated by Fitch for a single annual fee, which is expected to vary from USD10,000 to 
USD1,500,000.173 
 
Factors determining the amount of fees 
 
With respect to Moody’s, there are various factors determining the amount of fee for the 
particular rating, including the type of rating being assigned, the complexity of the 
analysis being performed, and the principal amount of the issuance.174 As for S&P, in 
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accordance with “S&P’s Ratings Services – U.S. Ratings Fees Disclosure”, the fees are 
determined by various factors including, but not limited to, the type of rating being 
assigned and the principal amount of the debt issuance that is rated. 175  In some 
circumstances, ongoing surveillance fees will be charged for so long as S&P maintain the 
rating.176 As distinguishable from Moody’s and S&P, the fee charged by Fitch is an 
agreed payment with the issuers, and remains constant irrespective of the assignment of 
rating grades or upon the successful completion of bond offering.177 The fee charged by 
Fitch is paid in advance of the release of the credit ratings and is only charged upon the 
agreement from the issuers.178 
 
Figure 3.1 Comparison of Cumulative Total Return since December 31, 2002 
 
Source: Moody’s Corporation, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20549, Form 10-K, Annual Report, Filed Feb 29, 2008 
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Figure 3.2 Moody’s History of Growth 
 
Source: Moody’s Corporation, Annual Report 2006. 
 
Figure 3.3 Moody’s Growth in Global Issuance of Rated Debt 
 
Source: Moody’s Corporation, Annual Report 2006. 
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Figure 3.4 Standard & Poor’s U.S. Ratings Fees Disclosure 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s, U.S. Ratings Fees Disclosure. 
 
3.5 Organizational Structure of CRAs 
 
Due to the fact that the organizational structure of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch is 
complicated in terms of their corporate division and affiliates, only the structure in 
relation to the credit rating business will be discussed.  
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3.5.1 Moody’s 
 
For the sake of clarification, in section 3.5 and section 3.6, the short term “Moody’s” will 
be transformed into “MCO” which stands for Moody’s Corporation, which is a listed 
company of Moody’s Investors Service (“MIS”). Otherwise, in all other chapters within 
this dissertation, for the sake of consistency, the short term “Moody’s” would still be 
adopted. 
 
The organizational structure of MCO can be mainly divided into two streams, namely 
MIS and Moody’s Analytics. The latter stream consists of three subsidiaries, including 
Moody’s KMV,179 Moody’s Economy.com,180 and other businesses. Figure 3.5 shows the 
most up-to-date organizational structure of Moody’s Corporation. MCO has its own set of 
policies and procedures181  to guarantee the independence, objectivity and integrity of 
MIS’ ratings and rating process. On the other hand, there is also another set of policies 
and procedures182 set up by MIS.  
 
 
                                                 
179 Moody’s KMV is the global provider of quantitative credit analysis tools to lenders, investors, and 
corporations. Available at http://www.moodyskmv.com/about/index.html 
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information flow among the three parties. See Moody’s, Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy. 
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employed by MIS, with MCO’s Code of Business Conduct, MIS’s Code of Professional Conduct and other 
applicable laws and regulations, which is overseen by the Legal Department, led by the MCO General 
Counsel; 2). separation from Ancillary Services, in accordance with Policy with Respect to Ancillary and 
Non-Rating Services, that may render a conflict of interest; 3). isolation of credit rating processes from the 
conflicts of interest in accordance with MIS’s Core Principles on the Conduct of Rating Committees and the 
management and elimination of conflicts of interest; and 4). trading restrictions to prevent of inside trading. 
See Moody’s, Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy. 
51 
Figure 3.5 Renewed organizational structure of Moody’s Corporation 
 
Source: available from www.moodys.com 
 
3.5.2 S&P 
 
Unlike Moody’s, S&P’s credit rating operates as an independent business, which 
separates itself from S&P’s non-rating businesses. With respect to the business activities 
operated outside S&P’s credit rating businesses, S&P’s credit ratings personnel are not, 
directly or indirectly, involved.183 There are provision of strong operational safeguards 
and policies to ensure operational independence of S&P credit rating services.184 Similar 
to Moody’s, strict firewalls are in place to safeguard confidential information from being 
given to credit ratings personnel and to obstruct information flow among any non-rating 
personnel.185 There are also provisions of professional code of conduct186 issued by S&P. 
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3.5.3 Fitch 
 
Within the Fitch Group, there are Fitch Ratings, Algorithmics,187 Fitch Training,188 and 
Fitch Information. Similar to the previous discussed two CRAs, Fitch also reiterates that 
objectivity, transparency and integrity are of paramount importance to the corporation and 
must be upheld. Similar to Moody’s and S&P, Fitch also sets up its own firewall 
policies189 and professional code of conduct.190 In addition, there are provisions to deal 
with the issue of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and securities trading policy.191 
 
3.5.4 Commentary on Organizational Structure 
 
One of the conflicts of interests arises from the provisions of ancillary businesses to the 
rated issuer by the same CRA. Moody’s KMV, Moody’s Economy.com, Algorithmics, 
and Fitch Information all can possibly give rise to the conflicts of interest. Even though 
that a significant number of provisions of firewall policies, professional internal codes of 
conduct have been set up by NRSROs to safeguard against the potential conflicts of 
interest and to prohibit certain acts to be conducted by the analysts, the degree of efficacy 
of these provisions are, to a large extent, subject to public doubts and suspicions. Also, 
the provision of disclosure of nonpublic information to the public is vulnerable, to the 
extent of compliance and enforcement. As addressed in the Final Rule – “Oversight of 
Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
                                                 
187 Algorithmics helps corporate to understand risk and cope with enterprise risk management. Available at 
http://www.algorithmics.com/EN/company/ 
188 Fitch Training provides credit and corporate finance training programs which are tailor-made for those 
who are working in fixed income, credit risk management and origination/relationship management. 
Available at http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/corporate/AboutFitch.faces?context=1&detail=19 
189 See Fitch Ratings, Firewall Policy. 
190 See Fitch Ratings, Code of Conduct. 
191 See i) Fitch Ratings, Confidentiality Statement., ii) Fitch Ratings, Confidentiality, Conflicts of Interest 
and Securities Trading Policy. 
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Organization” – issued by the SEC, it would be difficult to design procedures addressing 
activities of “household members since a household may include persons that the 
employee has no influence over, such as roommates”.192 Under such circumstances, there 
must be some “grey areas” which the provisions of policies cannot address. Second, due 
to the complex organizational structure, which may not be fully recognized by the analyst, 
it would be likely that the analyst had already engaged himself in the conflict of interest 
without realizing that. 
 
3.6 Rating Procedures and Process 
 
Although the rating process of various CRAs differs in the procedures, it is usually bound 
with several common procedures, namely (1) meeting with management, (2) rating 
committee, and (3) surveillance. It is crucial to understand the rating process of rating 
agencies before judgment of transparency can be made in accordance with every single 
step involved during the rating process. Due to the scope of the dissertation, the full 
details of the rating process of three rating agencies will not be listed out in this section; 
rather, only those noteworthy will be touched upon and discussed in depth. Similar to the 
previous section, for the sake of systemic organization and simplicity, section 3.6 
summarizes the entire rating process adopted by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch and provides 
an overall commentary on the individual process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission., 2007, Final Rule - Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. 
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3.6.1 Moody’s  
 
Upon the first time of credit rating of new issuers, an initial discussion is held to foster 
dialogue between the analysts and the issuer for mutual understanding.193 As the rating 
process goes on, regular meetings and site visits are conducted to understand all kinds of 
aspects of the rated company.194 Following all sorts of analyses are conducted, a rating 
recommendation is made to the rating committee which consists of a lead analyst and 
many credit risk professionals who have essential know-how and experience to tackle and 
identify all of the analytical perspectives. 195  The purpose of passing the rating 
recommendation to the rating committee is to ensure an objective view and judgment on 
the ratings made by a third party.196 The issuer will be informed of the rating result once 
the decision of the rating committee has been reached.197 Upon the potential changes in 
credit quality of the rated companies, those companies are to be mentioned in rating 
outlooks and the Moody’s Watchlist.198  
 
3.6.2 S&P 
 
Compared to Moody’s, S&P seems to be more transparent to the public about its rating 
process. Management meetings are scheduled several weeks in advance in order to 
                                                 
193 See Moody’s in Australia, Issuer Guide to Ratings.   [cited; Available from: 
http://www.moodys.com/australia/mdcsHighlightsPage.aspx?template=ratingsservices&mdcsId=6&section
=ratingsservices#top. 
194 The aspects of the rated company to be understood include the management quality, track record, 
attitude toward risk-taking, management structure, corporate strategy, debt structure and financial-related 
inside story. See Moody’s in Australia, Issuer Guide to Ratings.   [cited; Available from: 
http://www.moodys.com/australia/mdcsHighlightsPage.aspx?template=ratingsservices&mdcsId=6&section
=ratingsservices#top. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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facilitate the preparation of S&P analyst and the availability of appropriate participants.199 
Facility tours, if necessary, are conducted to expedite the understanding of the issuer’s 
company.200 As for the stage of rating committee, a presentation is given by the analyst to 
the rating committee about the analysis of the company.201 Prior to the public release of 
the rating, the company is notified of the result due to the fact that it has the right to 
launch an appeal, which will be entertained by S&P in the interest of having the available 
the most possible information.202 Similar to Moody’s, S&P also has the provisions of 
surveillance after issuing the credit rating. Figure 3.6 illustrates the whole process of debt 
credit rating. 
 
Figure 3.6 Standard & Poor’s Rating Process 
 
Source: S&P, Introduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 See S&P, Introduction. 
200 Id. 
201 Things to be presented include nature of the company’s business, operating environment, evaluation of 
the company financial strength and conditions, rating methodology and the rating recommendation. See 
S&P, Introduction. 
202 Id. 
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3.6.3 Fitch 
 
The initial stage of meeting with management of Fitch is very much similar to that of 
Moody’s and S&P.203 With respect to the stage of rating committee, one remarkable thing 
is that the voting rights are possessed by the leading analyst and a group of experienced 
analysts from outside the immediate asset class, sub-sector or geographic area of entity 
under review.204 The surveillance of Fitch is more alert than that of Moody’s and S&P.205 
The rating review is triggered by all of the analysts in groups whenever their awareness is 
heightened by any recent business activities such as Mergers & Acquisitions, any 
company announcement, or after a fiscal deterioration.206 Figure 3.7 illustrates the whole 
rating process of Fitch.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203 Fitch Ratings, 2006, The Rating Process. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
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Figure 3.7 Fitch Credit Rating Process 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings, The Rating Process, July 2006. 
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3.6.4 Commentary on Rating Procedures and Process 
 
The intention of CRAs to have meetings with management is good enough to have a 
better understanding of the nature and the details of the rated companies. However, it 
could also be the source where misconducts could arise, such as receiving benefits from 
the rated issuer to offer the credit rating to a “satisfactory level”, conditioning to issue a 
“satisfactory” credit rating upon receiving benefits, failure to ask probing questions about 
the real situation of the rated company and the like. On the other hand, the mechanism 
that CRAs grant permission for the rated issuer to file an appeal to the result of the credit 
rating before made public would also invite suspicions that whether the issuer is actually 
“negotiating” with CRAs for a better result of the credit rating. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
 
The group of debt/bond issuers, bond investors, portfolio managers, broker-dealers, 
market makers, and regulators are all identified as the interested parties of credit ratings. 
Despite CRAs’ provisions of firewall policies and professional internal codes of conduct, 
the degree of efficacy and enforcement of these provisions are subject to doubts. The 
complexity of the organizational structure of CRAs renders them inevitable to avoid all 
conflicts of interest and puzzles the analysts who may not be aware that they had already 
engaged in conflicts of interest. Loopholes can be spotted out in the rating procedures 
carried out CRAs. The most prominent one would be the alleged negotiation between the 
rated issuer and the analysts to reach a satisfactory during the stage of meeting with 
management and the stage of appeal.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS  
(The empirical study) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as a bridge linking between the previous factual studies and the later 
analytical ones. Another purpose served in this chapter is to keep the case of CRAs’ 
failure the most updated for the discussion of later chapters. In addition, by investigating 
the cause and the global impacts of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis (the empirical 
study), the serious consequences can be recognized, especially the facet of global impacts 
brought by such crisis when compared to other previous corporate scandals. 
 
The trigger of U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis not only caused huge impact to U.S. 
economy, housing market and stock exchange, which is more than likely to drag down 
U.S. economy to recession; but also stirred up global financial crisis, affecting many 
European Countries. Such a contagious turmoil is both hidden and explosive. Till now, 
the impact and level of damage generated by the crisis are still unknown to many 
financial sectors in many countries. Yet, once discovered, the global impact can bring 
domino turbulence and cause collapse in the banking sectors and many money-lenders. 
One of the by-products created is the confidence crisis – credit crunch, causing the 
tightening of the mortgage lending, deterioration of consumers’ confidence, further 
housing recession and severe economic downturn. 
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Many economists and critics have been pointing their fingers at the parties who are 
behind the scenes, contributing to such crisis. CRAs are one of those parties, which 
invited a lot of criticisms towards their behavior and professional conduct, which is the 
main theme of this dissertation. On top of that, it is crucial to understand the empirical 
case “U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis” including the cause and the impacts. As mentioned 
before, prior to the explosion of the subprime crisis, there have been scandals of other 
cases such as the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat 207 , which drew the 
attention from public on the alertness, accuracy, justification and timeliness on the ratings 
issued by CRAs. The outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S. is simply the 
trigger of the public awareness of the importance for the surveillance on CRAs. There is 
still a long road for the comprehensive development of the credit rating industry which 
the stakeholders can rely on to serve the original purposes.208  
 
4.2 Subprime Mortgages 
 
Subprime mortgages are known as the type of mortgages provided to the subprime 
borrowers who have poor credit records and who have difficulty in proving their repaying 
capacity to make monthly payments on the loan. In accordance with the U.S. Department 
of Treasury guidelines issued in 2001, “Subprime borrowers typically have weakened 
credit histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems 
such as charge-offs, judgments, and bankrupticies. They may also display reduced 
                                                 
207 The court cases will be discussed in Chapter 6 as a reference to their legal status. For the definition of 
legal status, see supra note 22. 
208 Please refer to section 2.5 for purposes of credit ratings. 
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repayment capacity as measured by credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, or other criteria 
that may encompass borrowers with incomplete credit histories.”209  
 
The guidelines also highlighted a detailed and thorough definition of the subprime loans 
which generally have a higher default risk than the prime loans. The definition of such 
loans is brought out by satisfying one or more of the following characteristics: 
 
• Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12-months, or one or more 60-day 
delinquencies in the last 24 months;210 
• Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months;211 
• Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;212 
• Relatively high default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit bureau 
risk score (FICO) of 660 or below (depending on the product/collateral), or other 
bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default probability likelihood; 
and/or213 
• Debt service-to-income ratio of 50% or greater, or otherwise limited ability to 
cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly debt-service 
requirements from monthly income.214 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Office of Thrift 
Supervision, 2001, Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, Broad of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
210 Id. 
211
 Id. 
212
 Id. 
213
 Id. 
214
 Id. 
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4.3 Causes of Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
US housing boom 
 
Dating back to 1998, there has been a huge increase in the housing prices and demand in 
the U.S. housing market. As shown in Figure 4.1, the homeowenership rates in the U.S. 
surged from 66.8% to the highest of 69.0% in 2006. Until then, the housing market in the 
U.S. was perfectly fine and blossomed with a growing trend that home owners and 
speculators were expecting a continual growth in the housing prices. The expectations in 
upsurge in home prices and the relaxation of the lenders’ underwriting criteria 
“encourage” homeowners to make future refinance. The profitable second mortgages and 
the eased lending standards allow homeowners to buy more expensive homes than they 
could afford with traditional fixed rates loans and more expensive than they can afford 
now when their adjustable mortgage loans are resetting.
215
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 Subprime Mortgage Crisis - What Led Us Here?   [cited; Available from: 
http://www.mortgagehomeloans-ic.com/subprime-mortgage-crisis-causes.shtml. 
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Figure 4.1 Homeownership Rates for the United States: 1981 to 2007 (in percent) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, Census Bureau Reports on Residential Vacancies and Homeownership. 
 
Collapse in Housing Market 
 
Starting from 2006, the housing prices in the U.S. showed signs of leveling off and later 
on significant drop, whereas at the same time, the borrowing interest rates rose to certain 
level that the more and more subprime borrowers were not able to afford to make 
monthly payment anymore, resulting in default in their mortgage payment. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the mortgage loan fraud trend between 1996 and 2006. Under the 
circumstances of increasing default rates, more and more money lenders in the U.S. 
suffered from liquidity problem and eventually filed for bankruptcy.  
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Figure 4.2 Mortgage Loan Fraud Reporting Trend between 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Regulatory Policy and Programs Division, 2006, 
Mortgage Loan Fraud - An Industry Assessment based upon Suspicious Activity Report Analysis. 
 
As the securitization of subprime mortgages grew more popular, more and more subprime 
mortgages were securitized into Mortgage-backed Securities (MBSs) and were sold to 
investors such as retail banks, investment banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and the like. In order that cash flow from the bonds suits particular investment 
requirements, the pools of subprime mortgages securitized into MBSs are divided into 
tranches.216 The CRAs will assign each tranch a credit rating. In order to facilitate the sale 
of the higher-risk tranches, those triple-B mortgage-backed securities are further packed 
into a new security called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), which were rated 
much higher by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s from triple-B to triple-A,217 and were 
later on sold to institutional investors, who had much confidence on those securities rated 
as investment grade. The consequence of the securitization was that many investors were 
                                                 
216 Kirk, Edward (Ned) J., The "Subprime Mortgage Crisis": An Overview of the Crisis and Potential 
Exposure. 
217 Laing, J.R., “Garbage In, Carnage Out” Barron’s, July 9, 2007.   
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not aware of the level of the risk inherited in the CDOs and MBSs in which they invested 
a large amount of money. 
 
Figure 4.3 Delinquency rate on residential mortgages by loan category 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey. 
 
Once the downturn of U.S. housing market exploded, more and more MBSs and CDOs 
defaulted, which caused huge loss in those institutional investors. Moreover, there was 
the “repurchase agreement” stipulated in the contracts signed during the sale of the 
mortgages that the lenders were required to repurchase the loans from the buyers if the 
default rates were excessive.218 It occurred that many lenders who could not discharge the 
repurchase of nonperforming loans filed for bankruptcy. What is more, the CRAs who 
initially rated those CDOs as investment grade dramatically changed them into 
                                                 
218 Kirk, Edward (Ned) J., The "Subprime Mortgage Crisis": An Overview of the Crisis and Potential 
Exposure. 
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speculative grade. Such a dramatic change not only triggered confidence crisis among 
investors, but also imposed credit crunch in the money-lending market causing credit 
tightening of banks. The whole process of the causes of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is 
summarized as a flowchart shown in figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Flowchart of Subprime Mortgage Crisis219 
 
 
Credit/Debt Cycle 
 
In front of the scene, it is more than evident that the reason triggering the outburst of the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis is the collapse in US housing market. Nevertheless, while the 
focus of the public lies on the number of money lenders filing for bankruptcy, losses 
incurred by the financial institutions, and tremendous impacts brought about by such 
crisis; few people would critically question about the underlying reason that arise the 
                                                 
219 For the sake of simplicity, some of the parties involved such as mortgage broker, servicer, etc., are 
omitted. Furthermore, the role and impact on central bank and Federal Reserve are not to be discussed here 
as beyond the scope of discussion. 
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collapse in the housing market. In other words, what sort of critical factors that switch the 
housing market in the US from soar to downturn? 
 
Minsky (1975), in his book “John Maynard Keynes”, identified the existence of a 
credit/debt cycle that the credit booms and asset bubbles would end up with a recession in 
the asset market after a climax of the soar has been reached.220 Dymski (1999) later on 
provided an exposition of Minsky’s cycle as follows: 
 
“Initially, balance sheets are robust because assets are conservatively priced 
and debt commitments modest; but during the course of an expansion phase, 
asset prices rise and debt burdens grow until finally liability commitments 
outpace asset returns and a downturn is induced. An economy becomes more 
financially fragile as an expansion proceeds, with the consequence that a period 
of financial instability is eventually reached: asset values fall, and a debt-
deflation cycle may be unleashed.”
221
 
   
Minsky (1975) also set forth the idea of relaxing of credit/lending standards among 
mortgage lenders and the occurrence of irrational credit bubbles. 222  All the 
abovementioned factors were satisfied in such mortgage crisis. The housing boom, asset 
bubble and the credit available all surged not in line with the economic fundamentals in 
the US. The subprime mortgage woe in the US has already transformed itself into credit 
crunch, which impose devastating effects on the credit available from the banks as well as 
the tightening of housing sales market in the US. 
 
 
 
                                                 
220 Minsky H., 1975, John Maynard Keynes, New York: Columbia University Press. 
221 Dymski G., 1999, Asset Bubbles and Minsky Crises in East Asia: A Spatialized Minsky Approach, 
University of California. 
222 Minsky H., 1975, John Maynard Keynes, New York: Columbia University Press. 
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4.4 Impact of the crisis 
 
Subprime Lenders 
 
Money lenders were the severely affected group in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. With 
many non-performing mortgages in hand, they suffered seriously from 1). the non-
recoverable bad debts, and 2). the obligation to repurchase those non-performing loans 
from the investors under the “repurchase agreement” signed in the contract. Ever since 
the outbreak of the crisis, many of the money lenders faced with financial and liquidity 
problems, and thereby laid off employees, shut down business lines and lastly resorted to 
filing for bankruptcy.  
 
Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC), the largest mortgage lender in the U.S., recorded a 
US$703.5 million loss in 2007,223  its first annual loss in more than 30 years. More 
recently, CFC was under the investigation of FBI on suspicion of accounting violations 
and possible securities fraud in relation to the subprime lending crisis.224 On 3rd April 
2007, New Century Financial, once the second-largest subprime lender nationwide, filed 
for bankruptcy and laid off 3,200 workers, including 500 workers in Orange County.225 
As the problems in subprime woe emerge, it is not surprising to see that more and more 
subprime lenders will suffer from financial dilemma. 
 
 
Financial Institutions 
                                                 
223 Countrywide reports leap in late payments, in South China Morning Post. 4th March 2008. 
224 FBI examines Countrywide for fraud, in South China Morning Post. 10th March 2008. 
225 New Century files for bankruptcy, cuts 3,200 jobs, in The Orange County Register. 3rd April 2007: 
California. 
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Many retail banks, investment banks, hedge funds, mutual funds and insurance companies 
were the major buyers of those securitized mortgages. Ever since the subprime meltdown 
did they realize those defaulted asset-backed securities (ABSs) purchased resulted in huge 
loss in revenue reflected in annual financial statement. A large sum of money was set 
aside for the provision for bad debts. In order to offset the loss incurred, more and more 
financial institutions slashed jobs to reduce the operating cost.  
 
Credit Suisse announced a US$2.85 billion write-down associated with subprime 
residential-mortgage-backed securities, reported in The Wall Street Journal.226  Merrill 
Lynch, another investment bank, claimed casualty of US$8.4 billion loss due to the 
failure of CDOs and misjudgment of their risks.227  
 
Economy and Financial Markets 
 
Ever since the outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
and the NASQAD stock market had accumulated significant drops, which was stunning 
to many domestic and international investors. The release of bankruptcies and failure 
linked with many money-lenders, investment banks and hedge funds further aggravated 
the confidence among investors, who were more than prone to withdraw their money 
from the stock market with a wait-and-see attitude. The law of demand sufficed to explain 
the catastrophic plunge in U.S. stock market, scattered with many pessimistic views from 
the economists. Despite the umpteenth efforts devoted in cutting the fed rate by the 
                                                 
226 Carrick Mollenkamp and Alistair MacDonald (2008, February 20), Credit Suisse's Surprise; Big Write-
Down Points To Valuation Failings, And More Bank Woes, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition).  
227 Ng, S. and Mollenkamp, C. (2007, October 25), Merrill Takes $8.4 billion Credit Hit; It Plunged Into 
CDOs In '03, Hiring Pioneer of the Debt Securities, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition).  
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Federal Reserve, they were of little help to the revitalization of the stock market with the 
structural problems in the economy left unsolved fundamentally. 
 
Global Impact 
 
As mentioned before, many financial institutions were not aware of the risks inherited in 
the bonds and securities they invested so far due to the fact that many of them are backed 
by bad home loans, often bundled into financial instruments such as CDOs. Many of the 
low-quality securities originated in the U.S. were later on “upgraded” by the CRAs and 
were purchased by many institutional investors around the globe. Such a phenomenon is 
especially notable to those retail banks which had the blemished securities in possession 
and later on discovered that a majority of assets were non-performing.  
 
On 14th September 2007, Northern Rock, the fifth largest mortgage lender in Britain, was 
faced with liquidity problem as hundreds of worried customers queuing to withdraw their 
money from the bank. Faced with the financial debacle, Northern Rock turned to the 
Bank of England for financial assistance. The global impact stirred up by the debacle of 
Northern Rock was contagious, provoking further sentiment among investors nationwide. 
The credit crunch brought about by the Subprime Mortgage Crisis was far more severe 
and pressing than expected. Some critics warned that the impacts of the subprime 
mortgage woes were underestimated in terms of the level of damage and the affected area 
in the world. 
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On 6 February 2008, in Amsterdam, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions released to the media the address of Subprime Crisis.228 In view of the 
crisis launched, four key issues were focused: 1). enhanced transparency by issuers and 
due diligence from the investors; 2). risk management process for intermediaries; 3). 
valuation and accounting issues; and 4). roles and duties of CRAs. The task force of the 
Subprime Crisis will come up a final conclusion in May 2008. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
Apparently, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis is largely attributed to the collapse in US 
housing market followed by the housing boom. The collapse in housing market triggers 
the a domino effect on the defaults of the subprime mortgage borrower, who typically 
have weakened credit histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly more 
severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies.229 Due to the purchase 
of the MBSs and the tie of the subprime loans to the CDOs, many loan lenders, domestic 
and institutional investors suffered and thus Subprime Mortgage Crisis burst out, resulting 
in credit crunch and devastating global impacts affecting worldwide. 
 
More importantly, behind the scene, CRAs, among others, were also allegedly involved in 
playing their role to stir up such crisis. The paradoxical “investment grade” assigned by 
those CRAs to the defaulted CDOs was somewhat a “sweet poison”, deceiving a 
significant number of investors including those working in the investment banks, which 
pride themselves on their expertise and experience in investment field. Undoubtedly and 
urgently, actions must be taken to preclude similar incidents repeating the history again.  
                                                 
228 See International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2008, Media Release. 
229 See supra note 218. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROBLEMS IN CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Following the study of causes and impacts of the empirical case “Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis’ in the preceding chapter, Chapter 5 leads us to question the underlying problems 
in the credit rating industry. The scope of the problems to be discussed below is not just 
limited to such crisis, but can also be found here, there and everywhere unsolved in the 
current credit rating industry. This chapter discusses, one by one, the problems found in 
the credit rating industry in the perspective of academic and institutional facet. 
 
5.2 Conflict of interest 
 
Conflict of interest has been one of the controversial issues with respect to the conduct of 
rating agencies.  There are many different kinds of conflicts of interest evolved in credit 
rating industry, including, but not limited to, 1). the relationship between the issuer and 
the credit rating agency which is paid by issuer to produce the ratings and allegedly 
elevate the ratings;230 2). the provision of consulting and other advisory services231 to the 
rated issuer, who would feel compelled to purchase such services accompanied with the 
                                                 
230 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
231 Frost (2006) addressed those customized credit risk management services and quantitative tools provided 
to the issuers through separate divisions See Frost, C.A., 2006, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: 
A Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, in Buffalo School of Management, 
State University of New York. 
73 
credit ratings in return for fear of a less favorable rating resulted232 (same rationale also 
applies to solicited ratings against unsolicited ratings); 3). the downplay of the credit risk 
(or the tendency to release favorable ratings) by rating agencies in order to retain the 
business relationship with the issuer233; 4). the access to non-public information which 
may lead to insider trading234; and 5). having a financial relationship with the issuer. 
 
As a matter of fact, the existence of conflicts of interest is no hidden agenda of the rating 
agencies. The US Senate235, SEC236, International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO)237 Committee of European Securities Regulators (CSER)238 and even the CRAs 
themselves have acknowledged the issue of the conflicts of interest existing in the credit 
rating industry. Note worthily, Covitz D.M. & Harrison Paul (2003) of the Federal 
Reserve Board compared the “financial incentives” found in conflicts of interest with the 
“reputational incentives” upheld by the rating agencies.239 Covitz and Harrison (2003) 
eventually concluded that, in accordance with their findings, no evidence proving the 
CRAs act in the interests of issuers due to conflicts of interest.240 Nonetheless, it was 
doubted that the test conducted by Covitz and Harrison (2003) did not encompass all sorts 
of conflicts of interests prevailed in the rating industry. As there are more and more 
ancillary services provided to issuers and the growing maturity and expansion of financial 
                                                 
232 See Elkhoury, M., 2008, Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on Developing Countries, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
233 The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003, Report on 
the activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 
234 Id. 
235 See Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
236 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission., 2007, Final Rule - Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. See also U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2003, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation 
of the Securities Markets. 
237 See The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003, 
Report on the activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 
238 See Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 2005, CESR’s Technical Advice to the 
European Commission on Possible Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies. 
239 Covitz D.M. & Harrison P., 2003, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Ratings Agencies with Market 
Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate, Federal Reserve Board. 
240 Id. 
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markets, conflicts of interest could be manifest in many different and undetectable forms. 
As a whole, it is rarely, if not entirely, impossible to prove the alleged act, let alone 
measure and quantify the level of the conflicts of interests.  
 
5.3 Lack of Competition 
 
The current credit rating industry is mainly dominated by the Moody’s and S&P (both of 
them predominated over 80% of the credit rating industry241) out of the five NRSROs242. 
As a result, duopoly (predominated by Moody’s and S&P) evolves. Considering the 
massive size, demand and growing maturity of securities and bonds, five NRSROs 
(regardless of the other small CRAs due to their poor recognition and reputation, 
deficiency in resources and competence, and their inability to compete in market niche 
with NRSROs), arise no fiery competition which is neither favorable to the debt rating 
market lacking in choices for the investors nor to the quality of credit ratings and the 
services provided to issuers. The underlying reasons contributing to the lack of 
competition can be categorized into two facets, namely the natural barrier and the 
artificial one. The natural barrier includes the economics of scale and expertise, network 
externalities, and the paramount reputation that make the entry nearly impossible.243 
 
The artificial barrier is largely attributed to NRSRO designation by the SEC, which serves 
as the gatekeeper to the credit rating industry.244 As a report published by US Senate 
pointed out that “in order to NRSRO status from the SEC, a firm must be ‘widely 
                                                 
241 Frost, C.A., 2006, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on 
Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, in Buffalo School of Management, State University of New York. 
242 See supra note 46. 
243 See Raymond W. McDaniel Jr., President of Moody’s Investor Services, in testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Banking Committee, February 2005. 
244 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
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accepted’ in the United States as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings; but, in practice, 
to become widely accepted,’ a firm needs the NRSRO designation.”245  Literally, the 
above statement looks like a trap in logic; nevertheless, in reality, this could be something 
much worse. The Department of Justice also expressed opposition to NRSRO designation 
and argued that “it is likely to create a nearly insurmountable barrier to de novo entry into 
the market for NRSRO services”246 
 
Even though there is a large coverage of provisions with respect to application for 
registration stipulated in the Securities Act of 1934 which was amended in accordance 
with the Credit Rating Rating Agency Act of 2006,247 the approval of the registration to 
be the NRSRO is still largely up to SEC’s discretion. For instance, section 15E 
“Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” of Securities 
Act of 1934 mentions the information required in order to render the application valid, 
such as the credit ratings performance measurement statistics over short-term, mid-term, 
and long-term periods of the applicant; the procedures and methodologies that the 
applicant uses in determining credit ratings, etc.248 Nonetheless, there is no stipulation in 
the act about the degree and to what certain extent these requirements shall be fulfilled for 
the approval by SEC. No wonder have there been so many CRAs fulfilling these 
requirements stipulated in the act and lining up in the application list of NRSROs, while 
there are only five NRSROs “nationally recognized” in the credit rating industry. The US 
Senate report also enumerated the paths pursued by SEC to give a better understanding 
and definition of NRSRO from 1994 to 2005.249  Finally, in 2006, the Credit Rating 
                                                 
245 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
246 Id. 
247 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec.4(a). 
248 Id. 
249 In 1994, a Concept Release was issued by SEC to seek public comment on the Commission’s use of 
NRSRO rating. Then, a Proposed Rule was published in 1997 to give the definition of NRSRO. In 2003, in 
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Agency Reform Act of 2006 provides a definite and unambiguous definition of 
NRSRO.250 Due to the rating-dependent regulations, issuers’ and investors’ reliance on 
ratings issued by NRSROs is far much more than those issued by non-NRSROs, which 
indirectly bolsters the current NRSRO designation. The intention of the enactment of the 
Rating Agency Act is to promote competition within the credit rating industry by 
allowing more CRAs to apply for the NRSRO designation in accordance with the 
provisions stipulated in the act. On the other hand, such a mechanism for NRSRO 
designation certainly discriminates against those new entrants who had not applied 
successfully for NRSRO designation. As a result, under such enactment, the Rating 
Agency Act indirectly makes those non-NRSROs more difficult to survive the credit 
rating industry.  
 
5.4 Ambiguous Accountability
251
 
 
With respect to the problem of the accountability, CRAs have long been operating in the 
business environment free from any liability to be born via the litigation and charges so 
far.252 This phenomenon is remarkably evidenced by the court decisions that the court 
tended to be in favor of the notion that it is unjustifiable and unreasonable for investors to 
rely on the credit ratings since the rating published is merely a subjective opinion, which 
is neither statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities 
                                                                                                                                                  
accordance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a report on the role and function of Credit 
Rating Agencies was issued by SEC. In March 2005, a rule proposal was issued to once again to define the 
term “NRSRO”. See Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, 
U.S. Senate. 
250 House Report 109 – 546 accompanying H.R. 2990, the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Act of 2006, pp. 
13.  
251 Refer to Chapter 6 for the details of the legal status of Credit Rating Agencies and the court decisions in 
response to the litigations. For the definition of legal status, see supra note 22. 
252 Id. 
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or make any other investment decisions.253 To make the situation worse, the credit ratings 
issued have been treated by the court as the “published speech” which is under the 
protection of the First Amendment. As a result, the group of issuers and investors are 
relatively in a weak and inferior position as opposed to the strong and superior position 
possessed by CRAs as a matter of law.254 As quoted from report published by Committee 
of European Securities Regulations (CSER), 
 
“Issuers are relatively weak compared to the CRAs because of their dependence 
on the ratings they get. Investors have not historically invested large resources in 
improving rating agencies behavior, perhaps because there was insufficient 
transparency on the way CRAs operated to facilitate this. This meant that CRAs 
have a very strong position.”
255
 
 
Rousseau (2005) identified the existence of “accountability gap”,256 which constituted an 
unchecked balance of power among various players in the credit rating industry. As for 
the CRAs, the accountability gap would undermine their credibility in the financial 
markets.257 As for the investors and the financial markets, they would suffer from losses 
without recovery for damages if much weight is put on the reliability of the debt ratings, 
and incur losses at a result of the volatility and the dramatic change of the ratings.258  
 
 
                                                 
253 See supra note 310 for the details of disclaimer. 
254 Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 2005, CESR’s Technical Advice to the European 
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5.5 Transparency and Disclosure Problems 
 
To enhance the transparency, the NRSRO has the obligation to fully disclose their 
financial statements and reports, corporate governance and its organizational structure. It 
is the transparency of CRAs, however, which has long been criticized by the public, who 
is very much concerned about how the rating agencies actually came to their rating 
decisions; from what crucial factors the debt ratings are derived 259 ; what pieces of 
concrete evidence, be them public or non-public, the ratings are supported by; and based 
on what sort of assumptions that those ratings are published to the public. The Senate 
report pointed out that “all five NRSROs make rating determinations in secret”.260 It also 
criticized the inconsistency of the nature and extent if the information disclosed to the 
public, varying from one credit rating agency to another.261  
 
Put economically, Frost (2006) set forth the theory that CRAs will voluntarily disclose 
only to the extent that the expected marginal benefit
262
 of disclosure exceeds the expected 
marginal cost.
263 Indeed, it would be of a big challenge for the rating agencies to balance 
between the benefits and costs incurred during the disclosure of information. Without 
questions, however, investors would be very much in favor of abundant information in 
                                                 
259 Despite the fact that S&P enumerated a list of factors to be considered in the process of rating, including, 
not limited to, firm’s competitiveness within its industry, the caliber of management, industry prospects for 
growth and vulnerability to technological change, labor unrest, regulatory actions, etc. S&P, supra note 56. 
Nevertheless, there is no indication that to what certain extent of these factors the rating agency is looking 
at and how the agency ranks them and sets the priority for consideration. 
260 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
261 Id. 
262 The benefits to the Credit Rating Agencies of increased disclosure include: (1) stronger reputation and 
credibility; (2) a higher quality credit ratings “product” that the marketplace will value, and (3) a better 
chance of preempting increased statutory or regulatory requirements or oversight. Potential costs of 
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information to users of credit ratings who then might no longer require the CRA’s services; and (3) 
increased vulnerability to litigation. See Frost, C.A., 2006, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A 
Review of Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, in Buffalo School of Management, 
State University of New York. 
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relation to the issuers as well as the CRAs themselves. In addition, Frost also addressed 
the poor definition of the disclosure adequacy that there has not been any objective test 
carried out to determine the level of accuracy of the disclosed information by the rating 
agencies.264 
 
One critical point raised by the Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions was that the most important source, either of public or non-
public information about the issuer’s credit worthiness, originates from the issuer itself.265 
Although it is commonplace for credit rating analysts to conduct face-to-face meetings 
with senior management of the issuer, the truthfulness of information presented to the 
analysts during the meetings is still left to a big question. Take Enron’s scandal as an 
example: the intentional act of concealing the truth and the fraudulent misrepresentation 
by Enron’s senior management rendered the false credit ratings released to the public. 
Supposedly, the duty of due diligence266 shall be competently discharged by the auditors.  
If the auditors failed to carry out the due diligence properly, it is logical to foresee that the 
accuracy and truthfulness of debt ratings would be jeopardized. Whether the CRAs shall 
undertake the “truthfulness test” – similar to the due diligence performed by auditors – on 
the information collected from the issuer shall deserve further discussion in the society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
264 Frost, C.A., 2006, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on 
Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, in Buffalo School of Management, State University of New York. 
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5.6 Lack of Diligence and Incompetence 
 
Failure to ask probing questions and warn of failures 
 
The outbreak of Enron’s scandal evidenced the rating analysts’ failure of asking probing 
questions of the company management. Put fairly, in light of the following two reasons, 
such a failure should be understandable provided that the analysts had already made their 
greatest effort to investigate the inside story of the rated issuer. First, Frost C.A. (2006) 
identified a “demand gap” between how rating agencies understand their role and duties 
and the expectations of policy makers and user groups.267 It is disputable, as mentioned 
before, whether CRAs shall be treated as “outside watchdogs”.268 Unlike accountants and 
auditors, as a matter of fact, CRAs are not to ensure the accuracy of financial statements 
and related information of the company; rather, they are to ensure the accuracy of their 
released ratings based on the information provided by the issuers. Second, even if they do 
suspect the truthfulness of the information collected and do ask probing questions of the 
company management,269 their competence to carry out “due diligence” is still subject to 
questions due to the lack of expertise and experience in due diligence when compared to 
the auditors. Supposedly, CRAs are the experts in the credit rating industry. Hence, the 
critical problem is whether the duty to carry out credit rating shall also include the duty to 
                                                 
267 Frost, C.A., 2006, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on 
Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, in Buffalo School of Management, State University of New York. 
268 Individually, each watchdog plays a particular role in monitoring the capital markets. Collectively, they 
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Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: “Financial Oversight of Enron: the SEC and 
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carry out due diligence to be imposed on credit rating analysts. If not, to what extent shall 
the duty to carry out credit rating include? Put fairly, it would be more legitimate to 
enforce the level of due diligence carried out by auditors before accusing CRAs of not 
asking probing questions. Otherwise, the rating agencies shall contemplate hiring a pool 
of talents with the knowledge of due diligence in the future. In such case, inevitably, there 
must be an upsurge in rating fees, which, as a result, attracted even more expectation from 
the issuers, investors as well as the government. 
 
In particular, Frost also pointed out the difficulty in timely warning of major failures by 
the CRAs, and that is often very easy to say the agencies should have been more 
inquisitive and probing after the major failures.270 By quoting the example of bankruptcy 
of WorldCom, Pulliam & Solomon (2002) also highlighted the challenges and difficulty 
faced by the watchdogs to detect the falsehood of the senior management and the falsity 
of the information provided.271 In the case of WorldCom, the company’s internal auditors 
were denied to access the key financial documents.272 Under such circumstances, it would 
be unfit and unfair to require CRAs to carry out the duties which even the auditors failed 
to do and to offer warnings of potential failure. 
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Timeliness and Quality of Credit Ratings 
 
There has been a considerable amount of criticisms of the timeliness and the slow 
response to the deteriorating financial conditions, especially in association with those 
high-profile corporate failures.273 In light of such criticisms, Moody’s published a Special 
Comment (The Bond Rating Process in a Changing Environment) and the second Special 
Comment (The Bond Rating Process, A Progress Report) to address the problem to 
enhance its quality and timeliness of the ratings.274 In particular, after numerous meetings 
held with various parties, Moody’s summarized in its report of “Understanding Moody’s 
Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process” that the market participants generally prefer 
ratings stability to ratings sensitivity.275  
 
The prompt response of credit ratings to the deteriorating financial conditions of issuers 
and financial markets could spur market volatility prior to the close of the stock market as 
investors are more prone to buy or sell shares in response to the altered rating.276 The 
suggestion to allow the altered ratings to be released only after the close of market – the 
purpose of which is to let the market “digest” the news in order to dampen volatility – 
could not solve the problem in cross-border trading operations.277 Market volatility still 
evolves in other stock markets in various time zones.278 In view of the abovementioned 
reasons, CRAs as well as the regulators might need to balance the volatility as a result of 
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sensitive change of ratings against the impacts brought by the delay (deliberate or 
negligent) of release of material information to the financial markets.279 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
 
It can be summarized that major problems in the credit rating industry include (1) conflict 
of interest, (2) lack of competition, (3) ambiguous accountability, (4) transparency and 
disclosure problems, and (5) lack of diligence and incompetence. It is concluded that the 
problems in the credit industry are interrelated with one another and that they can stir up 
the domino effect on the parties affected in financial markets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
LEGAL ISSUES OF CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In accordance with the preceding chapter, it can be observed that there has been a large 
coverage of discussion on the aforesaid problems by scholars, and that those problems 
were also touched upon in governmental and institutional regulations and documents. 
Nevertheless, whether the efficacy and the enforcement of such regulations and 
documents are questionable. Following the identification of problems associated with 
CRAs and the credit rating industry, this chapter further investigates the entire legal 
climate and the legal issues arising in the credit rating industry to discuss whether some, 
if not all, of the problems mentioned in the preceding chapter have been addressed or 
solved effectively in the current regulatory regime. This chapter is mainly divided into 
four sections, namely (1) Regulatory Bodies of CRAs; (2) Statutory and Non-statutory 
Regulations of CRAs; (3) Problems addressed by Statutory Regulations; and (4) Liability 
of CRAs. 
 
The vested interests possessed by stakeholders of CRAs – including debt issuers, 
borrowers, institutional investors, regulators, etc. 280  – are undermined given that the 
dominance of CRAs in the market is being strengthened as the demand on credit ratings 
expanded in such a versatile financial markets, whereas their accountability and liability 
                                                 
280 Please refer to section 3.2 for the understanding of the interested parties of credit ratings. 
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are still ambiguous in legal context. The regime of duopoly dominated by Moody’s and 
S&P281 might be intensified to the extent that the interested parties have no choice but to 
rely on their ratings even though the loopholes in the industry are well identified. Hence, 
it is of paramount importance to understand the legal regime of credit rating industry.  
 
6.2 Regulatory Bodies of CRAs 
 
6.2.1 Government Regulator in the U.S. 
 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a US-based regulatory body 
monitoring, overseeing and regulating the financial market in the U.S.282 Besides locating 
its headquarter office in Washington, SEC also sets up its regional offices throughout the 
country. The SEC, among all other regulators, is empowered the highest authority and 
regulating power over the CRAs because the SEC is entitled to take legal actions against 
those who are in contravention of the laws and regulations.283  
 
 
                                                 
281 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec. 2(1). 
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ratings agencies; 4). to oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting and auditing 
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laws that govern the Securities Industry. 
283 The laws and regulations include the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See 
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6.2.2 Non-U.S. Organizations 
 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
284
 
 
International Organization of Securities Commissions is an international organization 
formed to study the heated and controversial financial issues in relation to the securities 
markets around the globe. There are two executive committees of the organization, 
namely the Technical Committee and the Emerging Markets Committee. The former 
committee is made up of fifteen agencies that regulate some of the world’s larger, more 
developed and internationalized markets. The members of the Technical Committee are 
Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Ontario, 
Quebec, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. The function of the 
latter committee is self-explanatory that it is to advocate the development and 
improvement of efficiency of emerging securities and future markets.  
 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
285
 
 
CESR is an independent Committee of European Securities Regulators, which was 
established under the terms of the European Commission’s Direction of 6th June 2001.286 
The institutional framework of CESR is shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 6.1 Institutional Framework of CESR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Available from CESR website: 
http://www.cesreu.org/index.php?page=institutionalcontext&mac=0&id= 
 
As shown above, CESR produces reports to give advice to European Commission (EU 
Commission). In particular, CESR works closely with SEC in the US to discuss on the 
matters of regulations and the compliance of such. 
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6.3 Statutory and Non-statutory regulations of CRAs 
 
To date, the two allegedly most effective pieces of statutory regulations governing the 
credit rating industry shall be accredited to (1) Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006287 which leads to the insertion288  of section 15E in Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 289  and (2) Final Rule – “Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” issued by the SEC.290 On the 
other hand, there are numerous non-statutory regulations governing the credit rating 
industry, including publications issued by IOSCO, publications of CESR, CRAs’ Internal 
Rating Agency Code of Conduct and Policies, etc. 
 
6.3.1 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
291
 
 
Prior to the enactment of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, the legal status292 
(i.e. the legal position that CRAs have in the society, the rights that CRAs possess and the 
statutes that apply) of CRAs is rather ambiguous in law. In addition, in the old days, 
CRAs were invariably subject to little, if any, formal regulation or surveillance in most 
jurisdictions.293 Nowadays, the prominent law governing the regulation of CRAs would 
be the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (hereinafter called “Rating Agency 
                                                 
287 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. 
288 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. Sec. 4(a). 
289 15 U.S.C. 78o-7 
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293 Such a proposition is reflected by the court decisions made in the past, which will be discussed later in 
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Act”), which was enacted on 29th September, 2006.294 Such an Act, as a whole, provides 
coverage of issues which could be put into the context of legal regime. As observed from 
the contents of the Rating Agency Act, the focuses of the Act are two-fold. First, the Act 
fosters competition among the credit rating industry by explicitly listing out the 
requirements and the application procedures in application for NRSRO. Second, the level 
of surveillance on NRSROs is more rigorous and observable under the authorization 
obtained by the SEC from the Rating Agency Act to carry out regulatory duties. The 
structure of Rating Agency Act is as follows:295 
 
Section 1. Short Title 
Section 2. Findings 
Section 3. Defintions  
Section 4. Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
Section 5. Annual and Other Reports 
Section 6. Commission Annual Report, and 
Section 7. GAO Study and Report regarding Nationally Recognized Statistical  
Rating Organizations 
 
In particular, the major focus of the Rating Agency Act lies at Section 4(a) (“Registration 
of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”),296 which is an amendment to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter called the “Exchange Act”), by inserting 
section 15E (“Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”297) 
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after section 15D.298 The newly added section 15E lists out from (a) to (p) the issues in 
relation to procedural registration; application for becoming a NRSRO; and the business 
of CRAs. Among these issues, some of which address the problems those CRAs will face 
in general practice and in the course of business, such as the Prevention of Misuse of 
Nonpublic Information, 299  Management of Conflicts of Interest, 300  and Prohibited 
Conduct.301 
 
The enactment of the Rating Agency Act does bring up contributions to the regulations of 
the whole credit rating industry. First, it provides an authoritative definition for credit 
rating, CRAs, and Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. To the least 
extent, it draws boundaries and demystifies the meaning of those professional terms 
within the industry and makes them transparent to the public. Second, the Rating Agency 
Act replaces the conventional no-action letter302 process. Third, as remarked in the SEC 
Final Rule (“Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations”), the Rating Agency Act provides authority for the SEC 
to “implement registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting and oversight rules 
associated with the registered CRAs.”303 In this regard, the reliance of Rating Agency Act 
on the SEC, which will be discussed later, greatly enhances the regulatory power of the 
SEC.  
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6.3.2 Final Rule – Oversight of CRAs Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations 
 
As mentioned in section 4(n)(1)(A) of the Rating Agency Act, the final rule to the act 
shall be issued by the SEC not later than 270 days after the date of enactment.
304
 The 
effective date for most of the statutes is on June 18, 2007.305 The application of rule 
applies to several other acts and is revised based on some of them such as Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,306 Investment Company Act of 1940 307and also refers to the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. The issuance of Final Rule serves the purpose 
to comment and interpret the proposed rule of “Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”.308 It is observed 
that by addressing and interpreting certain acts in relation to the CRAs, the level of 
oversight over them is thought to be enhanced. Up to date, the final rule issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is the latest and the most comprehensive 
documentation associated with the legal issues of CRAs and the industry.  
 
Indeed, the Final Rule of the SEC does include a large coverage in regulating CRAs, 
ranging from the process of application for NRSRO to the prohibitions of misconducts in 
the credit rating industry. The issues identified are rather extensive and comprehensive, 
                                                 
304 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(n)(1)(A) 
305 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission., 2007, Final Rule - Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. for the effective dates for other 
statutes. 
306 The Rating Agency Act adds definitions to Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”), creates a new Section 15E of the Exchange Act and amend Section 17 of the Exchange Act. See 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, revised in September 2004. 
307 Rule 2a-7(c)(6)(i)(A)(2) requires the reassessment of the minimal credit risk of the portfolio by a money 
market fund whenever any unrated or second tier security held by the fund has been given a credit rating by 
any NRSROs below the NRSRO’s second highest category. In addition, the Rule 2a-7 also addressed that 
the eligibility for the purchase of a security is determined based on whether it has received a credit rating 
from one or two highest categories from any NRSRO. 
308 72 Fed. Reg. 6378 – 6431 (Feb. 9, 2007) 
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especially considering the total pages of the report of the Final Rule amounting to 284 
pages, including the content of standardized application form for registration as a NRSRO 
and the disclosure reporting page. In addition, numerous comments and concerns 
collected from different commenters from the public over the proposal rule of “Oversight 
of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations” are all dealt with by the SEC and thus the Final Rule was released.  
 
6.3.3 Publications by IOSCO 
 
The documentations published by the technical committee of IOSCO included “Report on 
the Activities of CRAs” and “Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of CRAs”. 
The contents of these two documents drafted were based on the perception that CRAs 
played a global role in the nationwide financial markets and that the recent financial 
scandals had raised the public awareness of the oversight on the their behaviour. The 
report, after the circulation of the questionnaires, identified and recognized the key issues 
in relation to the problem evolved in the credit rating industry for the securities regulators: 
1). CRA Independence and Conflicts of Interest; 2). Issues and Disclosure; 3). Public 
Dissemination of Ratings and Market Timing; 4). Preferential Subscriber Access to 
Information; 5). Challenges to New CRAs; and 6). Unsolicited Ratings.309 With respect to 
the statement published, it encompassed four major principles: 1). Quality and Integrity of 
the Rating Process; 2). Independence and Conflicts of Interest; 3). Transparency and 
Timeliness of Ratings Disclosure; and 4). Confidential Information.310  
 
                                                 
309 The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003, Report on 
the activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 
310 The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003, Statement 
of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies. 
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The technical committee, later in December 2004, issued “Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for CRAs” (the “IOSCO Code”), which the code of conduct suggested was 
intended to be adopted universally by CRAs. The IOSCO Code took views of the 
abovementioned four aspects of the “Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of 
CRAs” and laid down a set of corresponding code in detail. The IOSCO Code in itself, 
however, fails to address the enforcement of the code.311 Despite the fact that there is 
mention in the ISOCO Code that “…be backed by thorough compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms”, it seems that the adoption of the IOSCO Code is entirely at the CRAs’ own 
discretion. The reports issued by IOSCO, however, provide merely a set of guidelines, if 
not recommendations, more than Acts or regulations which are expected to be legal 
binding and can be enforced. After all, who shall be responsible for the enforcement of 
the code, either regulatory bodies or market mechanisms, or both? What shall be done to 
ensure that the IOSCO Code is something more than a set of guidelines in the eyes of the 
rating agencies? All of these questions are left unanswered by the IOSCO Code and are 
subject to arguments. Furthermore, the rigidity of IOSCO Code is questioned insofar as a 
degree of flexibility is allowed when the IOSCO Code is incorporated into the internal 
code of conduct of the CRAs. Again, the degree of flexibility, open to questions, is still 
not yet defined so far. The enforcement of compliance and the efficacy of the IOSCO 
Code are proved to be a failure evidenced by the credit ratings of US subprime backed 
securities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
311 Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent 
Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 5. 
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6.3.4 Internal Rating Agency Code of Conduct and Policies 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, virtually all NRSROs have their own internal code of conduct 
and policies to be implemented on the basis of the “Securities Act of 1934”, “IOSCO 
Code”, SEC Final Rule, and Rating Agency Act of 2006 in order to suit their own 
business need. Although different CRAs have different business models operating in 
different business environments, they share the same base of clients who expect equally 
high-quality credit ratings from the NRSROs to serve their investment needs. The 
deviations in their business models as well as their professional code of conduct was 
subtle in nature; nevertheless, due to the complex linkage between the CRAs and their 
stakeholders, it is yet to be discovered that whether the alleged misbehaviors were 
stemmed from such a subtle deviation. 
 
6.4 Problems addressed by Statutory Regulations 
 
Prior to the discussion of the problems addressed by statutory regulations, for the sake of 
simplicity and consistency to quote the relevant piece of statute, all the statements 
extracted from the section 4(a) of Rating Agency Act312 will be quoted as section 15E of 
the Exchange Act313 due to the fact that the former section is the insertion314 of the latter 
one.  
 
Three facets of problems are specifically mentioned in both the Exchange Act and the 
Final Rule, namely prevention of misuse of nonpublic information, management of 
                                                 
312 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec. 4(a) 
313 15 U.S.C. 78o-7 
314 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec. 4(a) 
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conflicts of interest, and prohibited conduct. The following section discusses, one by one, 
such three problems by evaluating the regulatory effectiveness of the Exchange Act and 
the Final Rule.  
 
6.4.1 Prevention of Misuse of Nonpublic Information
315
 
 
Section 15E(g) of the Exchange Act – PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF NONPUBLIC 
INFORMATION – highlights the utilization of organization policies and procedures as 
well as requirement of the issuance of final rule by the SEC in order to prohibit the 
misuse of material, nonpublic information. Section 15E(g)(1) first requires that “each 
NRSRO shall establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed, taking into consideration the nature of the business of such NRSRO, to prevent 
the misuse in violation of this title…”.
316
 In this regard, it seems the Act provides a large 
flexibility with the CRAs with respect to their written policies and procedures to prevent 
the misuse of nonpublic information. Due to the fact that different NRSROs have 
different business natures, it seemingly implies that each NRSRO will “establish, 
maintain, and enforce” different written policies and procedures reasonably designed. On 
the other hand, the term “reasonably” is disputable and the enforcement of the 
abovementioned statutory statement can be challenged in terms of the amount and 
comprehensiveness of policies and procedures to be established, maintained and enforced. 
In view of section 15E(g)(1)317 itself alone, the regulatory power is doubtfully substantive 
and controversially effective.  
 
                                                 
315 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(g) 
316 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(g)(1) 
317 Id. 
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Section 15E(g)(2) of the Exchange Act – “The Commission shall issue final rules in 
accordance with subsection (n) to require specific policies or procedures that are 
reasonably designed to prevent misuse in violation of this title…”
318
  – authorizes the 
SEC to issue final rules to prevent misuse of nonpublic information. In light of the 
expertise and knowledge the SEC has in the credit rating industry, during the enactment, 
the federal government deems it appropriate for the SEC to issue a set of regulations and 
rules best tailored to the industry itself. In addition, it is clearly indicated the final rules 
issued by the SEC are of same regulatory power with the Exchange Act as the SEC is 
authorized by such Act, and such authorization is also legally stipulated in the Exchange 
Act.  
 
In parallel to section 15E(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, Rule 17g-4 – PREVENTION OF 
MISUSE OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC INFORMATION – requires the NRSRO to 
establish, maintain and enforce the written policies and procedures to prevent misuse of 
material nonpublic information.319 However, the scope of prohibitions in the Final Rule is 
much broader than that in the Exchange Act. As opposed to the Exchange Act, the Final 
Rule encompasses three facets of prohibitions, including (1) the inappropriate 
dissemination within and outside the NRSRO of material nonpublic information;320 (2) a 
person within the NRSRO from purchasing, selling, or otherwise benefiting from any 
transaction in securities or money market instruments; 321  and (3) the inappropriate 
dissemination within and outside the NRSRO of pending credit rating action. 322  In 
addition, Rule 17g-4(b) provides a definition of “person within a NRSRO”,323 which 
                                                 
318 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(g)(2) 
319 Rule 17g-4(a) 
320 Rule 17g-4(a)(1) 
321 Rule 17g-4(a)(2) 
322 Rule 17g-4(a)(3) 
323 Rule 17g-4(b) 
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covers broadly as many relevant parties within a NRSRO as possible. Apparently, the 
coverage of Rule 17g-4 is much broader and much appreciated as different facets of 
misuse have been identified. However, similar to section 15E(g) of the Exchange Act, the 
provisions in Rule 17g-4 do not prescribe specific procedures for NRSROs to adopt in 
order to prevent misuse of material nonpublic information. In view of the regulatory 
effectiveness of Rule 17g-4 in dealing with this misconduct, same conclusion is drawn 
that the large flexibility offered can be manipulated as an excuse of different business 
natures. 
 
6.4.2 Management of Conflicts of Interest
324
 
 
Section 15E(h) of the Exchange Act – MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST – focuses on the internal and external management. The former management 
relates to the organizational policies and procedures of NRSROs, which rely on their 
judgment of their own business nature in order to address and manage the conflicts of 
interest in a reasonable way. The latter management, same as above, also authorizes the 
SEC to issue the final rule to regulate the management of conflicts of interest. In addition, 
the types of conflicts of interest NRSROs face in practice are divided into five categories, 
namely the manner in which a NRSRO is compensated;325 provision of ancillary business 
services;326 the existence of vested interest between the NRSROs and the clientele;327 
affiliation of NRSROs with those who underwrite the securities;328 and other potential 
conflict of interest deemed necessary by SEC.329 Furthermore, it is also recommended 
                                                 
324 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h) 
325 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(A) 
326 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(B) 
327 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(C) 
328 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(D) 
329 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(E) 
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that each NRSRO shall establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed
330
 by taking into consideration the nature of its own business. In 
view of the section 15E(h) of the Exchange Act alone, two characteristics can be 
observed. Firstly, large flexibility, similar to section 15E(g), is offered to the NRSROs to 
manage the conflicts of interest. Secondly, reliance, in consistent with section 15E(g), is 
laid on the final rule issued by the SEC. In particular, the term “without limitation” in 
section 15E(h)(2) indicates that the scope of conflicts of interest is not limited to the 
provisions stipulated in the Exchange Act. 
 
Rule 17g-5 – CONFLICTS OF INTEREST331 – is in line with section 15E(h) of the 
Exchange Act. With respect to the types of conflicts of interest, the coverage of the Final 
Rule is much broader and more specific than that of the Exchange Act, comparing nine 
types of conflicts of interest in the Final Rule with only five types in the Exchange Act. 
Notably, as opposed to section 15E(h), Rule 17g-5(c) specifically identifies four types of 
conflicts of interests that shall be prohibited, but not simply disclosed or managed due to 
the risk that they could cause undue influence. 332  Such prohibited conflicts are also 
deemed necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.333 
The classification between “the conflicts of interests that shall be disclosed and managed” 
and “the conflicts of interests that shall only be prohibited, but not managed or disclosed” 
demonstrates the expertise and the knowledge of the SEC in categorizing different types 
of conflicts in accordance with the degree of their seriousness. In addition, that also 
logically explains the reason for the Exchange Act to authorize the SEC to issue the final 
rule which is deemed more customized and tailored to the credit rating industry. 
                                                 
330 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(1) 
331 Rule 17g-5 
332 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission., 2007, Final Rule - Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. pp. 146. 
333 Id., pp. 149. 
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6.4.3 Prohibited Conduct
334
 
 
Section 15E(i) of the Exchange Act – PROHIBITED CONDUCT – in first place, similar 
to the above two, authorizes the SEC to issue final rules to prohibit any act or practice 
relating to the issuance of credit ratings by a NRSRO that the SEC determines to be 
“unfair, coercive, or abusive.”335 The three facets of prohibited acts and practices that 
section 15E(i) of the Exchange Act covers are (1) conditioning the issuance of credit 
ratings on the purchases of other services and products;336 (2) threatening to lower credit 
ratings unless certain portion of assets is rated;337 and (3) modification of credit ratings 
based on the purchases of services and products.338  
 
Rule 17g-6 – PRHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES – lists out four prohibited acts and 
practices that the SEC deemed unfair, coercive, or abusive.339 In particular, Rule 17g-
6(a)(1), 17g-6(a)(2) and 17g-6(a)(3) encompasses all possible situations in relation to the 
issuance of credit ratings, including (1) the situation to condition or threaten to condition 
the issuance of a credit rating on the purchase of any other services or products of the 
NRSRO;340 (2) the situation to issue, or offer or threaten to issue a credit rating that is not 
determined in accordance with the NRSRO’s established procedures and methodologies 
for determining credit ratings, based on whether there is a purchase of the credit rating or 
any other service or product;341 and (3) the situation to modify, or offer or threaten to 
                                                 
334 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(i) 
335 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(i)(1) 
336 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(i)(1)(A) 
337 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(i)(1)(B) 
338 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(i)(1)(C) 
339 Rule 17g-6(a) 
340 Rule 17g-6(a)(1) 
341 Rule 17g-6(a)(2) 
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modify a credit rating in a manner that is contrary to the NRSRO’s established procedures 
and methodologies for modifying credit ratings based on whether there is a purchase of 
the credit rating or any other service or product.342 Under these three provisions, Table 
6.2 summarizes the acts or practices that are prohibited. 
 
Table 6.2 Acts or practices prohibited by  
Rule 17g-6(a)(1), Rule 17g-6(a)(2) and Rule 17g-6(a)(3) 
1. The NRSRO conditions or threatens to condition to issue a credit rating 
only if the NRSRO’s other service or product is purchased. 
2. The NRSRO issues or threatens to issue a lower credit rating if the 
NRSRO’s credit rating or other service or product is not purchased. 
3. The NRSRO issues or offers to issue a higher credit rating if the 
NRSRO’s credit rating or other service or product is purchased. 
4. The NRSRO increases or offers to increase the existing credit rating if 
the NRSRO’s credit rating or other service or product is purchased. 
5. The NRSRO decreases or threatens to decrease the existing credit rating 
if the NRSRO’s credit rating or other service or product is not purchased. 
 
As indicated in the Table 6.2, five situations of acts or practices are aptly prohibited by 
Rule 17g-6(a)(1), Rule 17g-6(a)(2) and Rule 17g-6(a)(3). With respect to Rule 17g-
6(a)(4), 343  competition within the credit rating industry will be enhanced and thus 
investors will be benefited in structured products.344 
                                                 
342 Rule 17g-6(a)(3) 
343 “Issuing or threatening to issue a lower credit rating, lowering or threatening to lower an existing credit 
rating, refusing to issue a credit rating, or withdrawing or threatening to withdraw a credit rating, with 
respect to securities or money market instruments issued by an asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or 
mortgage-backed securities transaction, unless all or a portion of the assets within such pool or part of such 
transaction also are rated by the nationally recognized statistical rating organization, where such practice is 
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However, the Exchange Act together with the Final Rule are not without limitation. 
Section 15E(c)(2) of the Exchange Act acknowledges the following: 
 
“LIMITATION.–The rules and regulations that the Commission may prescribe 
pursuant to this title, as they apply to nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations, shall be narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of this title 
applicable to nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Commission nor any 
State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit 
ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.”
345
  
 
Such a limitation could be manipulated by CRAs as an excuse to circumvent the 
prohibitions stipulated in both section 15E(i) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17g-6 such 
that the lowering or heightening of credit ratings (arguably deemed as the “substance” of 
credit ratings”) is purely due to nature of the methodologies that determine the ratings, 
rather than due to the issuer’s purchase of the credit ratings, other services and products. 
Under such circumstances, neither the Commission nor any State can regulate such 
misconducts even though the truth tells the otherwise. Second, as mentioned earlier, the 
term of “reasonably” found in section 15E(g)(1), 15E(h)(1) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
17g-4(a); and the absence of specific procedures to prevent of misuse of material 
nonpublic information and to manage conflicts of interest offer a large degree of 
flexibility to NRSROs to establish, maintain, and enforce the written policies and 
procedures346 reasonably tailored to their nature of business. The term “reasonably” can 
be interpreted differently by different people and that the different natures of business of 
                                                                                                                                                  
engaged in by the nationally recognized statistical rating organization for an anticompetitive purpose.” See 
Rule 17g-6(a)(4). 
344 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission., 2007, Final Rule - Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. pp. 163. 
345 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(c)(2) 
346 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(g)(1); 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(1); Rule 17g-4(a) 
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different NRSROs may also be the impediment to hold NRSORs liable for their alleged 
misconducts. 
 
6.5 Liability of CRAs 
 
6.5.1 Regulatory Liability Exemption and the First Amendment 
 
Before studying the past court cases in relation to the lawsuit against CRAs, it is of 
paramount importance to recognize that the fact that CRAs are protected by the 
regulatory liability exemption and the First Amendment. Section 11 of Securities Act of 
1933 – CIVIL LIABILITIES ON ACCOUNT OF FALSE REGISTRATION 
STATEMENT 347  – includes the concept of exemption of liability of the CRAs. 348 
Furthermore, the success in defending against litigation by claiming the business of credit 
rating is purely financial information publishing and thus the credit ratings are sheer 
“opinion” has been protecting those CRAs from liability by First Amendment349  and 
Regulation FD.350  Schwarcz (2002) equated the credit rating to the pure information 
provided by the issuer and thus argued that CRAs would not bear the liability of 
fraudulence. 351  Paradoxically, CRAs’ excuse of protection by First Amendment 
                                                 
347 Pursuant to Rule 436(g)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 230.436(g)(1), NRSROs are 
exempted from liability: “The security rating assigned to a class of debt securities, a 
class of convertible debt securities, or a class of preferred stock by a nationally recognized 
statistical rating organization . . . shall not be considered a part of the registration statement 
prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act.” 
348 See Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, revised in September 2004. 
349 Partnoy, F., How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in School of Law. 
2005, University of San Diego. pp.10. 
350 Please see the discussions of court cases in relation to the exemption of liability by the First Amendment 
in later section in this chapter.  
351 Schwarcz, S.L., Private Ordering of Public Markets: the Rating Agencies Paradox., U.III.L. Rev. 1 
(2002): “Because rating agencies make their rating determination based primarily on information provided 
by the issuer of securities, a rating is no more reliable than that information. Ratings thus do not cover the 
risk of fraud.” 
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insidiously exposes the fact that they wordlessly admit that their ratings released are 
neither credible nor accountable. 
 
In order to realize the legal capacity of CRAs, and to understand their legal issues and 
status, it is remarkably crucial to analyze several court cases and look into the court 
decisions in association with the CRAs (three individual cases pertinent to Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch will be studied). 
 
6.5.2 Enron’s Failure 
 
Enron has been rated “investment grade” until 28th November 2001, on which Enron’s 
debt was downgraded to below-investment-grade “junk” status. Dramatically, after 4 days, 
on 2nd December 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy. There were, of course, a huge loss 
incurred by Enron’s investors, creditors and Enron’s own employees under such a 
bankruptcy. What lay behind such a sudden and “creepy” financial failure of Enron have 
attracted the coverage of many government reports, newspaper articles, research papers 
and books since 2001.352 The reasons for the bankruptcy were many-fold.353  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
352 See Hill C.A., 2003, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron. See Enron’s Credit Rating: 
Enron’s Bankers’Contacts With Moody’s And Government Officials, January 2003. See Collins, D., 
Behaving Badly: Ethical Lessons from Enron. 2006: Dog Ear Publishing. See Rating the raters, Enron and 
the Credit Rating Agencies, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Congress (March 2002). See Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: 
“Financial Oversight of Enron: the SEC and Private Sector Watchdogs”, S. Prt. 107-75 (October 7, 2002). 
353 See Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: “Financial Oversight of 
Enron: the SEC and Private Sector Watchdogs”, S. Prt. 107-75 (October 7, 2002) for the cause and effect of 
the Enron scandal. 
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Problem of accountability 
 
The main spot of the criticism lay on those accountants and auditors, who produced 
erroneous financial statements and reports in accordance with seemingly satisfactory data 
and figures provided by Enron. The act that senior management of Enron knew very well 
the difficulty of financial status and nevertheless manipulated the financial records and 
presented them to the gatekeepers 354  could be regarded as fraud. 355  The failure in 
discharge of due diligence356 by the auditors, which resulted in mistaken credit ratings 
released by the major rating agencies contributed to the horror in the outbreak of Enron’s 
scandal. Indeed, it is Enron’s board of directors and the auditors who shall be blamed; 
nonetheless, the CRAs, playing the role of the very last gatekeeper in financial markets, 
shall not be free from the liability despite the protection by the regulatory exemption and 
First Amendment. Denying the accountability for their credit ratings would only 
undermine the credibility and reliance among investors. 
 
Real purpose and effect of senior management meeting 
 
Although the duty of CRAs is to evaluate the information provided by the rated issuers 
and release educated credit ratings on issuers’ financial soundness, there are reservations 
that rating agencies take such information for granted without doubting the truthfulness 
and accuracy of the information. After the outbreak of the scandal, they shifted the burden 
                                                 
354 The term “gatekeepers” here includes Enron’s board of directors, auditors and Credit Rating Agencies. 
355 “Fraud encompasses an array of irregularities and illegal acts characterized by intentional deception. It 
can be perpetrated for the benefit of or to the detriment of the organization and by persons outside as well as 
inside the organization.” See Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), former standard 280-04. 
356 “Due diligence is commonly defined as an investigation into the affairs of an entity which may be a 
division, a company, a group of companies or some other form of business entity, prior to its acquisition, 
flotation, restructuring or other transaction.” See Harris, J., 2000, Due Diligence Accounting Practice, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
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of responsibility to auditors for not discharging due diligence properly. Under such 
circumstances, one would question the purpose of conducting management meetings 
during the rating process, and doubt of its underlying effect. If all the fingers shall be 
pointed at improper due diligence of auditors, does it imply that the face-to-face 
management meeting merely serves the purpose of information “give-and-take”? If not, 
does meeting with senior management mean something more than the understanding the 
background of the rated issuer (e.g. negotiating with senior management on the credit 
ratings released to the public)?  
 
Narrow rating perspective on short-term factors 
 
Since Enron tied up with many ratings triggers357 in the agreement with its investors, the 
sudden downgrade of its credit rating on 28th November 2001 led to rapid acceleration of 
the debt obligation for $690 million358, which resulted in the liquidity problem suffered 
by Enron and eventually bankruptcy. The sudden downgrade was mainly attributed to the 
disappointment of CRAs by the remote likelihood of the merger with Dynegy.359 It was 
four days later that Enron declared bankruptcy after the downgrade of credit ratings. 
Clearly, it was rather ironic to believe that such a large corporation, which had been rated 
“investment grade”, to file for bankruptcy in just four days. Such an irony, however, was 
evidenced by the dramatic change of credit ratings. As a matter of fact, it took more than 
six-week period from the first warning of downgrades through the declaration of 
                                                 
357 See supra note 137 for understanding of ratings trigger. 
358 Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: “Financial Oversight of Enron: 
the SEC and Private Sector Watchdogs”, S. Prt. 107-75 (October 7, 2002). 
359 Prior to the news of merger with Dynegy, there had been many negative news pertinent to Enron, 
including the alleged concealing of corporate losses and the overstatement of the income. It was the news of 
merger with Dynegy that restored the confidence among the Credit Rating Agencies as well as the investors, 
who believed that the merger would stabilize Enron’s financial status. See Report of the Staff of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs: “Financial Oversight of Enron: the SEC and Private Sector 
Watchdogs”, S. Prt. 107-75 (October 7, 2002) for the details of Enron’s scandal. 
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bankruptcy.360 It seems that the principle of credit ratings was distorted in the way that 
they are more sensitive to the disclosure of the latest news, regardless of good or bad, 
than the fundamentals and the underlying financial soundness of the rated issuer. No 
wonder did the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee come to the conclusion that “the 
CRAs were dismally lax in their coverage of Enron. They didn’t ask probing questions 
and generally accepted at face value whatever Enron officials chose to tell them.”361 
 
6.5.3 Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs. Inc.
362
 
 
Compuware Corporation, the plaintiff, sued against Moody’s Investors Services, Inc., the 
defendant, alleging 1). breach of contract, 2). defamation,363  3). silent fraud, and 4). 
violation of the Investment Adviser’s Act.364 While dismissing allegation of silent fraud 
and violation of the Investment Adviser’s Act in the first place, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit gave considerations on the allegation of defamation and violation of 
the Investment Adviser’s Act, and thereby derived thorough discussions and justifications 
on its decisions made by the district court. In the end, the Court of Appeals dismissed all 
appealed claims and affirmed District Court’s original decisions made. 
 
 
 
                                                 
360 Hill C.A., 2003, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron. 
361 Senate Government Affairs Committee, Press Release, October 2002, available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/100702press2.htm 
362
 See __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). 
363 A defamation is “a communication to third parties of false statements about a person that injure the 
reputation of or deter others from associating with that person”, extracted from Merriam-Webster's 
Dictionary of Law. 1996, Merriam-Webster. 
364 In late 1999, Compuware asked Moody’s to rate its ability to repay funds borrowed under a $900 million 
revolving bank credit facility. Due to the scope of the dissertation, please see __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 
(6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007) for the entire detail of the case. 
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Claim for Defamation 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals asserted that the claim for defamation by Compuware 
Corporation, which was qualified as a public official or public figure, requires the definite 
proof that Moody’s “acted with actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth” during 
the provision of the services agreed in the signed contract.365  In order to prove the 
existence of actual malice, Compuware Corporation needed to present nothing more than 
the genuine issues of material fact that Moody’s made the statement with knowledge of 
its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth.366 
 
Pursuant to the interpretation of defamation and the discussion on the defamation claim, 
there are several points noteworthy to be mentioned here. First, the Court of Appeals set 
forth that Compuware’ review of Moody’s ratings report prior to publication already 
“constituted consent to publications” and “immunized Moody’s from a suit in tort over 
any statement or omissions to which Compuware did not object.”
367 In view of the court, 
NRSROs’ common and usual practice of last meeting prior to the publication (for the 
purpose of reviewing the information and ratings disclosed to the public) subtly protects 
them from the allegation and dissipates the underlying intention of actual malice acted 
upon the issuers. Second, the Court of Appeals also reiterated the significance of the 
intention to be demonstrated in accusation of the actual malice by citing a precedent 
(Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990)) that reckless disregard 
“requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct”,368  which inferred that 
the proof of the defamation lies substantially with the intention behind, i.e. the purposeful 
                                                 
365 See __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
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disregard of the truthfulness, instead of negligence. Third, the most importantly, the Court 
of Appeals also, in particular to this case which could possibly be utilized as a legal 
doctrine, appreciated the nature of a credit rating as a predictive opinion and the 
inherently subjective nature of credit ratings. “Breathing space” to the freedoms of speech 
was the description the Court of Appeals adopted in order to uphold the legal spirit of the 
First Amendment.369 To the worst, in light of the abovementioned grounds, the Court of 
Appeals even negated the possibility (as such, such a negation could set up a bad 
precedent in the future) to prove the falsity of any factual connotation.370 If such an 
inference of “subjective opinion” applies to whatever credit ratings issued hereafter, the 
principle of credit ratings would be distorted and the reliability of credit ratings would be 
largely undermined with the “approval” of the court. It is neither equitable nor reasonable 
to the investors who invest in issuers’ bonds unless the functions of credit ratings in 
financial markets serve more than their original purposes. 
 
Claim for Breach of Contract 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed that the claim for breach of contract would trigger the 
issue of actual malice, reasoning that the publication of credit ratings is a form of 
constitutionally protected speech
371  and thus the standard of actual malice discussed 
above applied to the contract claim. The court also assimilated the facts presented in this 
case to the facts in the case, County of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos372, which will be 
discussed later on. Rogers, Circuit Judge, however, disagree with the application of the 
                                                 
369 See __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). 
370 Id. 
371 Id. 
372 See 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
109 
issue of contract to the standard of actual malice (tort law).373 He warned that equating the 
claim for breach of contract with the proof of actual malice simply elevates the protection 
that CRAs enjoy.374 
 
In addition, pursuant to the signed contract between Moody’s and Compuware 
Corporation, Moody’s has discharged its duties without violation of any explicit provision 
of the contract. The allegation that Moody’s breached an implied contractual covenant by 
failing to perform skillfully and diligently can only be rendered as an issue of 
negligence.375 Despite the fact the signed contract exhausted all terms and conditions both 
parties were required to observe in the first place, there were still limitations in the 
contract such as the degree of expectation and satisfaction of the duties to be discharged. 
 
6.5.4 County of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos.
376
 
 
County of Orange, the plaintiff, sued against McGraw-Hill Cos., the defendant, alleging 
1). breach of contract and 2). professional negligence claims. 377  Similar to the case 
Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs. Inc. discussed above, McGraw-Hill Cos. 
was also alleged to breach the contract with Compuware Corp. by failing to perform 
contractual services in a competent and reasonable manner and the analytical review 
                                                 
373 He first reasoned that “contract can commit parties to take action even though the government may not 
be able to command the identical action because of constitutional limits on government power.” He then 
further argued that “the fact that a contract requires ‘reasonable care’ does not mean that a claim for 
breach of contract is the equivalent of a tort claim for negligence.” See __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). 
374 See __F.3d__, 2007 WL 2386565 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). 
375 Id. 
376 See 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
377 Until County of Orange declared bankruptcy, Standard & Poor’s was in a contractual relationship with 
County of Orange responsible for the ratings of the County’s notes and bonds. Shorting in June 1996, after 
the outbreak of bankruptcy, County filed a lawsuit to S&P claiming the ratings in between 1993 and 1994 
were unreasonably high. See 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
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necessary to rate its debt offerings.
378 Likewise, the U.S. District Court, Central District 
of California, applied the standard of “actual malice”379 to the claim for breach of contract. 
The factors required by the court in order to prove the existence of actual malice 
conducted by McGraw-Hill Cos. put tremendous burden on County of Orange to recover 
damages from McGraw-Hill Cos. In the end, the dispute was settled by McGraw-Hill Cos. 
for merely $140,000, a small amount of the damages when compared to the original claim 
for $2 billion damages by the plaintiff.380 
 
Protection of Speech by the First Amendment 
 
The court tended to be in more favor of the perspective that the debt rating or collectively 
the pertinent publication released by CRAs is a kind of public speech, which is 
constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.381 The fact that the court had been in 
favor of the proposition that credit ratings shall be protected by the First Amendment 
could be manipulated by the rating agencies as a “legitimate defense” inherited in their 
publications. They will be no longer accountable for any ratings to be released afterward, 
and they would be free from liability for truthfulness and credibility of the debt ratings in 
light of the automatic trigger of such a defense.  
 
 
 
                                                 
378 See Sack J.S. & Juris S.M., Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future. New York Law Journal, 
2007. 238(88). 
379 See supra note 273. 
380 See Sack J.S. & Juris S.M., Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future. New York Law Journal, 
2007. 238(88). 
381 As a matter of law, the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and respects the right entitled 
by all people to publish their opinions in the public.  
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6.5.5 Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs. Inc.
382
 
 
Jefferson County Sch. Dist., the plaintiff, sued against Moody’s Investor’s Servs. Inc., the 
defendant, alleging 1). intentional interference with contract, 2). intentional interference 
with business relations,383  3). publication of an injurious falsehood, and 4). antitrust 
claims.384 All of the above allegations were dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit and no claim for damages could be recovered by the plaintiff.  
 
Claim for Publication of an Injurious Falsehood 
 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the claim based on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to 
prove that the unsolicited rating published by Moody’s contained a provably false factual 
connotation.
385
 Moreover, it appeared to the Court of Appeals very much tolerated the 
ratings of the CRAs, evidenced by the argument proposed by the court that “the 
difference in the evaluators’ assessments of the bonds could result from differing views 
about the relative weight to be assigned to those factors or from other philosophical or 
                                                 
382 In 1993, the School District decided to refinance part of its bonded indebtedness by issuing refunding 
bonds, thereby obtaining the benefit of lower interest rates. Even though it had retained Moody's in the past, 
the School District selected two other agencies to rate its bonds. As a result, it paid no fee to Moody's and 
provided Moody's with no information about its current financial condition. (…) Moody's stated that 
although it had not been asked to rate the bonds, it intended to assign a rating to the issue subsequent to the 
sale. Moody's then discussed the bonds and the School District's financial condition, concluding that "[t]he 
outlook on the district's general obligation debt is negative, reflecting the district's ongoing financial 
pressures due in part to the state's past underfunding of the school finance act as well as legal uncertainties 
and fiscal constraints under Amendment 1. (the above paragraph is wholly extracted from the original 
copy). See 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). 
383 “For a plaintiff to assert claims for intentional interference with contract and business relations, he/she 
must prove that the interference was intentional and improper. Whether the interference is “improper” 
depends on the following factors: (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct; (b) the actor’s motive; (c) the 
interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes; (d) the interests sought to be advanced by 
the actor; (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of the actor and the contractual interests of the 
other; (f) the proximity of the actor and the contractual interests of the other; (f) the proximity or 
remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference; and (g) the relations between the parties.” The above 
paragraph is entirely extracted from the original copy. See 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).  
384 The legislation of “antitrust” is “to protect trade and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies 
or unfair business practices”, extracted from Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. 1996, Merriam-
Webster. 
385 See 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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theoretical disagreements rather than from one evaluator’s reliance on inaccurate 
information.”
386 
 
Claim for Intentional Interference with contract and business relations 
 
The allegations in this case, when compared to the previous cases discussed, were 
somewhat peculiar due to the fact that Moody’s did not have any contractual relationship 
with Jefferson County Sch. Dis. at the time when the lawsuit was filed. As a matter of fact, 
all of the allegations were based on the content of the publication of the unsolicited 
ratings released by Moody’s. The concept of actual malice was, once again, brought to 
the claim for intentional interference with contractual and business relations. Even though 
the plaintiff addressed, stressed and reiterated that those claims were aimed at the conduct, 
not the speech of Moody’s,387  the court still dismissed such claims on the grounds that 
allowing the plaintiff the tort claim by proving merely that a particular motive 
accompanied protected speech would challenge the robustness of the First Amendment.  
 
Claim for Antitrust Claims 
 
At the very beginning, Jefferson County Sch. Dis. pointed out that the First Amendment 
provides publishers with no immunity from the antitrust laws.388 Despite the fact that the 
plaintiff asserted that Moody’s intention of publishing the unsolicited rating is to retaliate 
against the plaintiff for deciding to use other CRAs,389 the Court of Appeals nonetheless 
                                                 
386 See 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). 
387 As such, it is believed that the plaintiff knew very well in light of the precedents that the court would, 
without question, dismiss the claims had the plaintiff sued against the credit ratings released by rating 
agencies. 
388 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
389 Id. 
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dismissed the claim, reasoning that “the speech itself was not the sole means of 
restraining trade.”
390 Put differently, the speech itself – implying the credit rating – does 
not suffice to constitute an antitrust violation. Secondly, the Court of Appeals also 
extended the regime of the First Amendment to antitrust law that the former regulation 
would not allow the claim for latter one to be predicated solely on protected speech.391 
 
6.5.6 Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos.
392
 
 
Maurice L. Quinn, the plaintiff, sued against the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., the 
defendant, alleging 1). negligent misrepresentation393 and 2). breach of contract between 
S&P and the issuer, to which the plaintiff was the third party beneficiary.394 This case was 
very much significant to the extent that the plaintiff virtually had no contractual 
relationship with McGraw-Hill but suffered as a result of abrupt downgrade of ratings and 
later on the default of the bonds invested by the plaintiff. The role played by the plaintiff 
was somewhat analogous to that played by the group of investors in financial markets. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the end, affirmed the decisions 
made by the district court and rejected all of claims by the plaintiff.395 
 
Claim for Breach of Contract 
 
                                                 
390 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
391 Id. 
392 Id. 
393 For the claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff is required to prove (1) a false statement of 
material fact, (2) carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by defendant, (3) an 
intention to induce the other party to act, (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the 
statements, (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance, and (6) a duty owed by defendant to 
plaintiff to communicate accurate information. The above paragraph is entirely extracted from the original 
copy. See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
394 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
395 Id. 
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It occurred that McGraw-Hill Cos. signed the contract with American Home Acceptance 
Corp. (“AMAC”) promising to discharge duty of bond ratings for issuer. Considering 
with the fact that the plaintiff was the investor of the collateralized mortgage obligations 
(“CMOs”) and eventually incurred losses, the plaintiff asserted breach of contract based 
on the rationale that he himself is “a third-party beneficiary of the contract”.396 The 
Court of Appeals highlighted the difficulty to prove intention to benefit the third party 
and argued that “there is a strong presumption that parties to a contract intend that the 
contract’s provisions apply to only them and not to third parties.”
397
 Put differently, such 
proof could only be made possible if and only if there is eplicit and express terms 
stipulated in the contracted signed by both parties that third parties are subject to the 
benefits of the contract or that third parties are the beneficiaries; otherwise, the proof of 
being the beneficiary under the contract would only be rendered futile. The parties 
involved in the contract should have recognized very well the investors and the like as the 
direct beneficiaries under the contract. Ironically and ridiculously, the decision of the 
District Court and the affirmation of the Court of Appeals inferred the otherwise. What is 
more, the Court of Appeals also doubted investors’ reliance on the ratings released by 
rating agencies.398 
 
Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation 
 
Among the criteria required to prove negligent misrepresentation,399 the Court of Appeals, 
in the first place, doubted of the existence of duty of care owed to the plaintiff by bringing 
                                                 
396 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
397 The content of the italic sentence is extracted from the case report. However, the concept was originated 
from another case citied by the Court of Appeals. See Harbor Drive Condominium Ass’n v. Harbor Point, 
Inc., 568 N.E.2d 365, 375 (III. App. Ct. 1991). 
398 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
399 See supra note 300 for the criteria required to prove negligent misrepresentation. 
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out the issue about the justification for the plaintiff’s reliance in the negligent 
misrepresentation
400
 as well as the “the factor to be considered in determining whether a 
plaintiff’s reliance is foreseeable and justifiable.”
401
 The most critical point here was that 
the plaintiff failed to justify his reliance on credit ratings. In addition, similar to many 
other CRAs, there is always the provision of disclaimer402 appeared in nearly every report 
and documentation published by S&P, which seemingly eliminates liability to be born. 
Together with the influence of First Amendment, the shielding effect generated could 
protect CRAs from any litigation associated with the credit ratings. 
 
6.5.7 Summary of court cases 
 
Up to this point, the CRAs seem to have been operating their business in the “green 
house” free from any liability incurred by litigation or legal pursuit in relation to their 
credit ratings. The major reasons are three-fold. First, the rating published has been 
deemed by the court as an opinion which is constitutionally protected by the First 
Amendment. Second, the lawsuit of breach of contract filed either by the issuer or by the 
investor who is equitably deemed as the third party beneficiary would trigger the standard 
of “actual malice”, which imposes an onerous burden for the plaintiff to prove its 
                                                 
400 See 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999). 
401 Id. 
402 “Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error by S&P, its affiliates or its third party 
licensors, S&P, its affiliates and its third party licensors do not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, 
completeness or availability of any information and is not responsible for any errors or omissions or for the 
results obtained from the use of such information. S&P GIVES NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE. In no event shall S&P, 
its affiliates and its third party licensors be liable for any direct, indirect, special or consequential damages 
in connection with subscribers or others use of the data/information contained herein. (…) The credit 
ratings and observations contained herein are solely statements of opinion and not statements of fact or 
recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or make any other investment decisions. 
Accordingly, any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other 
opinion contained herein in making any investment decision.” The above paragraph is extracted in part 
from the disclaimer of the report. See S&P., S&P Rated Local Government Investment Pools Weathering 
Storm”, 2007. 
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existence. Third, among all the charges against the rating agencies, the claim for negligent 
misrepresentation appears to be the most plausible since the negligent misrepresentation 
is out of topic of contract law but the tort law, which would not trigger “actual malice”. 
Court’s denial of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff by rating agencies, however, 
negated further discussion of negligent misrepresentation. What is more, since the regime 
of the negligent misrepresentation lies within the tort law which is again protected by the 
First Amendment. At the end of the day, the investors are left defenseless. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The major regulatory bodies of CRAs include the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the U.S., the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). In the current regulatory 
regime, these three entities work closely together in a collaborative way to regulate the 
CRAs and monitor the credit rating industry.  
 
The two prominent statutory regulations are the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enacted 
by the federal government and the Final Rule of “Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
promulgated by the SEC. Although the Exchange Act is deemed to lack breadth and 
depth in coverage, the Exchange Act, as stipulated, authorizes the SEC to issue the Final 
Rule which, on the other hand, provides a broader and deeper coverage on the issues to be 
regulated and prohibited. The Final Rule of the SEC, as the integral part of the Exchange 
Act, literally becomes the supplements to strengthen the regulatory power and broaden 
the legal boundary of the Exchange Act. 
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Problems addressed in the Exchange Act and the Final Rule include (1) misuse of 
nonpublic information; (2) conflicts of interest; and (3) prohibited acts and practices. 
After the analysis of the above two pieces of regulations in curbing the problems, it is 
concluded that many, if not all, problems in the credit rating industry could be addressed 
and regulated by the current statutes despite the existence of the limitations. The first 
limitation is that the provision of section 15E(c)(2) restricts the SEC and the State to 
regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies adopted by 
NRSROs to determine the credit rating. 403  The second limitation is that the term 
“reasonably” found in the Exchange Act and the Final Rule404  can be leveraged by 
NRSROs to escape from incurring legal consequences.  
 
                                                 
403 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(c)(2) 
404 See supra note 354. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PROPOSAL OF REGULATORY REFORM 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
After the discussion of the legal regulations and legal issues associated with CRAs in the 
preceding chapter, the legal framework in relation to the credit rating industry has been 
clarified and well understood through the analysis of statutory regulations and law cases. 
This chapter studies the regulatory reliance on the credit ratings, reviews the current 
regulatory regime, recent regulatory initiatives and past proposals of regulatory reform, 
and finally sets forth a well-suited proposal of regulatory reform at the last of this chapter. 
 
7.2 Regulatory reliance on the credit ratings 
 
One of the major concerns over credit ratings is the regulatory over-reliance. One 
prominent example, mentioned earlier, is the Basel II’s reliance of risk weights on the 
external rating grade in the Standardized Approach.405 The net capital requirements of 
Rule 15c3-(1) highlight the application to “investment grade” securities held by broker-
dealers.406 Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Act establishes limitations to high-quality short 
term securities in money market fund investments and labels the use of NRSRO ratings to 
                                                 
405 See supra note 151. Refer also to Table 3.2. 
406 Rule 15c-3(1). 
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establish minimum quality standards. 407  Form S3 of the Securities Act of 1933, a 
registration statement eligible exclusively for nonconvertible debts, preferred securities, 
and asset-backed securities also requires the investment grade by at least one NRSRO.408 
The incorporation of the wording of “nationally recognized statistical rating organization” 
and their released rating indicates the penetration of the concept of NRSROs and their 
credit ratings into various acts in federal legislation. It seems that SEC has not, if not 
refused to, a fully comprehensive “internal credit ratings” system to evaluate the debt 
ratings on which the whole regulatory framework and the legislation could be built; but to 
rely on those external credit ratings released by NRSROs to shape their regulatory 
structure.  Champsaur A. (2005) argued that it is the regulatory value established by the 
regulators, rather than the informational value intrinsically inherent in the rating itself, 
boosts the demand of credit ratings by so many different parties.409 Put bluntly, parties 
feel compelled and pressured to use credit ratings for fear of not passing regulatory 
requirement and receiving the allegedly deliberate downgrade of their ratings in the form 
of unsolicited ratings. (Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs. Inc.)410 
 
The reliance on external credit ratings for regulatory purpose, on one hand, saves much 
effort of SEC indeed; while on the other hand, could be a detriment to the normal 
operation of financial markets if the information conveyed by those external debt ratings 
is neither informational nor reliable. Champsaur challenged whether it is reasonable to 
require reliance without reliability 411  on credit ratings. He further addressed the 
                                                 
407 Rule 2a-7. See also Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the 
E.U.: Recent Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 24. 
408 See Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent 
Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University. pp. 24. 
409 Id. 
410 See supra note 290. 
411 Champsaur attributed the reliability of the ratings to two factors: (1) the accuracy of the credit risk 
assessment and (2) the assessment which is independent from any of the parties who have vested interest. 
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impossibility to regulate the credit rating industry via “market-based mechanisms” due to 
the widespread use of credit ratings and the incorporation in loan agreements and 
regulatory schemes;412 and warned against the consequences had the credit rating been 
found inaccurate and deceiving.413 The strong tie of credit ratings established with the 
current market and with the current regulatory regime means that it must take large 
amount of time, effort and costs in order to derive a comprehensive system under which 
the credit ratings are both trustworthy and of informational value. 
 
7.3 The Future Regulatory Regime and Reform Proposals of Credit 
Rating Industry 
 
7.3.1 Current Regulatory Regime and Recent Regulatory Initiatives 
 
Nowadays, in light of the several large corporate scandals and the mounting concerns 
over the oversight of CRAs, there has been a magnitude of documents, reports and 
consultation papers published by various parties varying from official regulatory bodies 
and international organizations to individual published papers to offer suggestions and 
proposals for the feasible regulatory reforms. Indeed, the common goals shared by such 
documentation is to establish a universally transparent, reliable and accountable credit 
rating landscape where investors, issuers and regulators can put their faith on the 
legitimacy of CRAs’ conducts and the accuracy of the credit ratings.  
                                                                                                                                                  
See Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent 
Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 29. 
412 Id. pp. 31. 
413 Market’s allocational incentives, cost structures and competition could be distorted had the credit ratings 
been found inaccurate. For instance, the financial safety and soundness of the whole banking system would 
be threatened if credit ratings do not adequately reflect the credit risk that those bonds rated as “investment 
grade”, which had been purchased by banks, were in fact over-rated or “junk bonds”. See Champsaur, A., 
2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent Initiatives and Proposals, 
in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 34. 
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As mentioned earlier, being the official regulatory body in the US financial market, it is 
incumbent on the SEC to take up the regulatory role in order to monitor the operations in 
financial markets through enacting regulations and rules. The final rule SEC 2007b414 
summarized all the previous works and documents, and presented the public with the 
pressing issues of CRAs and the interpretation of Securities Act of 1934 in relation to the 
credit rating industry. The enactment of Credit Rating Rating Agency Act of 2006415 
provides the definition of NRSRO, the details of registration and the requirements for 
application for NRSRO. The primary purpose of the Rating Agency Act is to facilitate 
and advocate competition in the credit rating agency business.416 
 
As for Europe, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), throughout the 
time, has issued various reports evaluating the activities of CRAs, including, but not 
limited to, “CESR’s technical advice to the European Commission on possible measures 
concerning CRAs”417  in 2005, “CESR’s Report to the European Commission on the 
Compliance of CRAs with the IOSCO Code”418 in 2006, and the consultation paper of 
“The role of CRAs in structured finance”419 in 2008. In particular, in accordance with the 
“CESR’s technical advice to the European Commission on possible measures concerning 
                                                 
414 See supra note 237. 
415 S. 3850 [109th]: Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006., Sec. 3(a)(62). 
416 See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 3850, 
Credit Rating Agency Reform of 2006, S. Report No. 109 – 326, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6, 2006). 
417 CESR/05-139b.  
418 CESR/06-545. 
419 Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 2008, The role of Credit Rating Agencies in 
structured finance CONSULTATION PAPER. 
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CRAs” 420  in March 2005, the EU Commission chose to adopt the “wait and see 
approach”421 to allow an evaluation of the impact of the IOSCO Code on the industry.422  
 
The latest consultation paper, published by the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) in February 2008, highlighted the current several key features of the 
current regulatory regime: (1) The current rules and regulations are perceived to impose 
no constraint on the flexibility and innovation within the financial markets due to the 
market forces to drive and enforce the compliance; (2) Credit ratings so far are not 
afforded an “official” recognition that could intensify the over-reliance on the ratings; (3) 
Obvious and implementation costs are avoided.423  Under such regulatory regime, the 
following negative features can be observed: (1) Regulators are equipped no investigative 
power to determine substantial CRA compliance with the IOSCO Code; (2) Regulators 
are afforded no power to enforce CRAs’ compliance with the IOSCO Code but rely fully 
on market forces. Discrepancy in viewpoints on the intention and interpretation of certain 
IOSCO Code provisions drives even greater reliance on market judgment; (3) The 
incorporation of ratings into the banking regulatory system may render the market forces 
ineffective as an incentive for CRAs’ compliance with the IOSCO Code; (4) There are 
limitations in self-regulation if CRAs operate in a oligopolic424 market.425 
 
                                                 
420 See supra note 378. 
421 The “wait and see approach” states that where no recognition system is set up at present, the effects of 
the IOSCO Code are let to work. The introduction of the IOSCO Code states that the IOSCO Technical 
Committee may revisit the Code in the future if modifications are necessary. See supra note 380. 
422 See supra note 380. 
423 The Committee of European Securities Regulators., The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured 
Finance. February 2008.  
424 “An oligopoly is a market having few firms (but more than one firm) on the supply side and a very large 
number of buyers on the demand side, each of whom makes a negligible contribution to the market demand 
function.” See Friedman, J.W., Oligopoly theory. 1983: Cambridge University Press. 
425 The Committee of European Securities Regulators., The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured 
Finance. February 2008. 
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Although substantive rules of conduct proposed by SEC and IOSCO deal with similar 
concerns of issues in relation to CRAs’ activities and conduct, the attitudes of both 
entities implementing the rules of conduct differ with each other. SEC tends to be in favor 
of maintaining the current use of NRSRO concept and designation, which is deemed 
instrumental in regulating the entry and imposing clearer, more rigorous and more 
demanding requirements for the application for NRSRO with respect to agencies’ 
organization and conduct.426 On the other hand, the IOSCO tends to be in favor of the 
“self-regulatory approach”, 427  which is likely to be followed by the European 
Commission. In general, there is a discrepancy in viewpoints of how to regulate the CRAs 
in the organizational level. Table 7.1 summarizes the current approaches to CRA 
regulation both in the US and Europe. 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of the U.S. and E.U. current approaches to CRA regulation428 
 U.S. E.U. 
Main regulator SEC Bank supervisors 
Regulatory tools Credit Rating Agency Act of 2006, 
Final Rule – “Oversight of Credit 
Rating Agencies Registered as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations” by the SEC 
No registration of CRAs, but 
recognition by bank regulators for 
regulatory purposes 
IOSCO Code SEC does not recommend adoption 
by CRAs of IOSCO Code, but the 
NRSRO recognition criteria 
relating to conduct of business rules 
seem likely to be achieved by 
implementing the Code. 
CESR recommends adoption by the 
CRAs of the IOSCO Code. 
There is no enforcement mechanism 
(CESR relies on market enforcement) 
Recognition criteria - Published ratings 
 
- Market acceptance of CRAs 
 
- Conduct of business rules 
 
- Integrity of methodologies 
 
- Credibility of ratings 
 
- Conduct of business rules 
 
                                                 
426 Mayer C., 1995, “The Regulation of Financial Services: Lessons from the U.K. for 1992”, in Bishop M., 
Kay J., & Mayer C., The Regulatory Challenge, Oxford, OUP pp .148. 
427 It will be discussed later in details. 
428 See Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent 
Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 46. 
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Recognition goals Efficiency of securities markets - Efficiency of securities market 
(IOSCO Code) 
 
- Adequacy of capital requirements 
 
Ongoing supervision Limited (SEC reserves the right to 
reexamine conditions on which 
granted NRSRO status) 
Permanent 
(as required by the CRD) 
Recognition procedure Explicit in accordance with the 
Credit Rating Agency Act of 2006 
Bank regulators are bound by the 
CRD rules and further details 
Civil liability No (First Amendment protection) Never established but possible 
Securities laws Exemption under Regulation Fair 
Disclosure 
No exemption under the Market 
Abuse Directive 
Competition The SEC believes that more precise 
NRSRO designation criteria will 
foster competition and that 
competition is a means of 
regulating CRA performance 
(also promoted by the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006) 
CESR believes that competition 
issues should not be taken into 
account in establishing CRA rules 
and should be left to antitrust 
authorities. 
Source: Champsaur, A., The Regulation of CRAs in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent Initiatives and Proposals, 
in Law School. 2005, Harvard University. pp. 46. 
 
7.3.2 Review of proposals for regulatory reforms  
 
With respect to various published reports and papers, the recommendations and the 
proposals for reforms seem to converge to the same point: market-based solution. 
Pursuant to the US Senate Report, while encouraging more competition within the credit 
rating industry, the Congress noted that “the key to increasing competition is to eliminate 
the SEC’s gatekeeping function and to allow new market entrants.”429 Hill C. (2004) 
abandoned the idea of immediate elimination of NRSRO designation but proposed to 
increase the number of NRSROs, to allow for a public comment process and to revisit the 
issue of elimination in five years.430 Champsaur A. (2005) upheld the regulation of CRAs 
in the way analogous with “journalism ethics” by enacting and establishing a professional 
                                                 
429 Kyl, J., 2006, Removing a Regulatory Barrier: Breaking up the Credit Rating Cartel, U.S. Senate. 
430 Hill, C.A., 2004, Regulating the Rating Agencies, in American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
125 
code of conduct.431 Rousseau S. (2005) stressed the importance of the cost-effectiveness 
to be considered in the regulatory regime by identifying two types of costs likely to be 
incurred during the regulatory reforms, namely “administrative cost” and the “compliance 
cost”.432 The former cost arises where there are formulation of rules and standards of 
conduct, the surveillance of the behavior as well as the enforcement of compliance.433 
The latter cost very much depends on the degree of precision and flexibility of 
regulation.434 Rousseau further warned of the risk of stirring up moral hazard that the 
regulatory reform is carried out for the private goals of concentrated interest groups. In a 
nutshell, regulatory reformation shall only be limited to areas where there exists a piece 
of concrete evidence indicating market failure. 435  Rousseau concluded to propose a 
disclosure-based approach to enhance CRAs’ accountability and to introduce an 
additional level of regulatory supervision over them.436 
 
7.3.3 Proposal for regulatory reform 
 
As shown above, there have been so many different voices and proposals prevailed in the 
society to call for regulatory reforms. Such phenomenon is especially evident as the EU 
commission was presented with four options.437 It seems, however, none of the options 
prevailed over the other, which explained why EU commission eventually opted for the 
                                                 
431 Champsaur, A., 2005, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. and the E.U.: Recent 
Initiatives and Proposals, in Law School, Harvard University, pp. 38. 
432 Rousseau, S., 2005, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-
Based Approach, in Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, pp. 41. 
433 Id. 
434 Id. 
435 Mayer C., 1995, “The Regulation of Financial Services: Lessons from the U.K. for 1992”, in Bishop M., 
Kay J., & Mayer C., The Regulatory Challenge, Oxford, OUP pp .148. 
436 Rousseau, S., 2005, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-
Based Approach, in Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, pp. 63. 
437 The four options are: (1) monitoring market developments; (2) third party certification or enforcement of 
the IOSCO Code; (3) a registration/regulation regime; and (4) including the IOSCO Code with the CRD’s 
recognition procedure. See CSER/05-139b. 
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“wait and see approach”. Summarizing all of the abovementioned recommendations and 
proposals, it was discovered that every single proposal is embedded with its own merits 
and demerits which can not proved to predominate over the others.438 
 
The most fundamental question about the regulatory reforms is to what level the 
regulators shall excise their regulatory power in the credit rating industry. The 
weight of the involvement of regulatory power shall be monitored and balanced 
cautiously that the regulations and rules set forth shall not be too rigorous and demanding 
for CRA to follow, resulting in impediments to innovation in credit ratings, unwillingness 
of CRAs to rate highly risky debts, and the further enforcement of regulatory barrier to 
new entrants intensifying the phenomenon of oligopoly;439 nevertheless, the market-based 
regulatory approach shall not be relied entirely and blindly that the large CRAs could use 
their leverage to exercise control over and manipulate the market in their own interests 
which in turn discriminates against those small and newly formed CRAs, and that the 
compliance with the IOSCO code and certain professional codes of conduct will be 
entirely at their own discretion and the enforcement of compliance will be rendered 
impossible at that time due to the over-reliance on market disciplines to regulate the 
CRAs. 
 
My proposal will offer a set of market-based and pragmatic recommendations to 
regulatory reforms in credit rating industry. It is acknowledged that the problems 
embedded in the current credit rating industry are rather entrenched and had plagued 
many different aspects and had grown complex due to the growing demand and 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings as well as the diversity of ancillary services provided 
                                                 
438 See Rousseau (2005) for the commentary on different proposals. 
439 See supra note 381 for the definition of oligopoly. 
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by CRAs. Hence, rather than one single approach or dimension of means, it is suggested 
that the regulatory reforms shall feature different approaches after the consideration of the 
merits and demerits of the proposal.  
 
a. Market-based self-regulation 
 
Rather than relying on one-sided regulatory approach by SEC and other regulatory bodies, 
market-based approach should be preferred. As discussed previously, reputation is the 
key asset of CRAs, which is perceived as the largest incentive for CRAs to pursue and 
uphold. Such a reputational incentive serves as the axis of the market-based self 
regulation that any form of alleged misbehavior or suspected deviation from the standard 
of the professional code would attract public’s awareness, undermining the reputation. In 
addition, the market disciplines can be in the form of consumers’ preference, regular 
publication of market commentary on the performance of CRAs, credibility of credit 
ratings, and ranking of the reliability of CRAs by some financial magazines and 
newspapers, and the like. One noteworthy point here is that there is very little competition 
in credit rating industry nowadays. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the enactment 
the Rating Agency Act is believed to expedite competition in the industry. Such a market-
based self-regulation, therefore, can only be effective provided that there is competition in 
the industry under the influence of Rating Agency Act.  
 
b. Establishment of Institute of CRAs (hereinafter called the “Institute”) 
 
In light of current credit rating industry, there is a lack of communication between the 
CRAs and SEC/regulatory bodies, and a lack of intercommunication between the CRAs 
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and the public who are very much concerned with the agency problems. The concept of a 
“Institute of CRAs”, at a national, regional or international level,440  is more or less 
analogous to those professional (accountants, solicitors, bankers, etc.) associations and 
bodies representing their members. Such an institute sets up its own internal professional 
code of conduct, based on the blueprint of the IOSCO code, for its members to follow. In 
order to be eligible for the membership which is subject to renewal annually, the CRA 
must meet certain requirements and standards of practice established by the institute. The 
established rules and code of conduct shall be binding on its members through contractual 
arrangement.441  It is incumbent on the institute to release regular publications on its 
member list, the most updated internal code of conduct, viewpoints and solutions to the 
problems of CRAs to the public so as to enhance the transparency. The institute is entitled 
to rule out individual’s membership upon failure to comply with the code of conduct and 
standards of practice, which will be made public via its publications. In this regard, the 
reputational incentive is magnified through establishment or destruction of membership 
by the institute so that compliance with the codes and rules are no longer at CRAs’ 
discretion. The SEC will be responsible for the continuous oversight of the regulatory 
activities of the institute on its own members that the SEC will be entitled to intervene in 
rule-making, to remain informed of the institute’s activities, and to review disciplinary 
decisions.442 The institute is to furnish with the SEC its annual report, internal code of 
conduct, member list and its report on the regulatory activities on its own members. The 
institute serves as a bridge to foster better understanding of the public on credit rating 
industry and as the sole agent of the SEC to facilitate oversight of CRAs.  
 
                                                 
440 Rousseau, S., 2005, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-
Based Approach, in Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, pp. 51. 
441 Id. 
442 Rousseau, S., 2005, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-
Based Approach, in Faculty of Law, University of Montreal, pp. 54. 
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The establishment of such an institute of CRAs shall be on a national basis, i.e. 
throughout 52 States in the U.S. The reasons for proposing the national nature are two-
fold. First, the targets of CRAs to be regulated can be narrowed to those which only 
operate their business in the national financial markets, rather than various financial 
markets in the world. In such cases, the workload born by the institute could be much 
reduced, and the scope of the regulation can be more tailored and customized to the 
current demand and regulatory climate in financial markets nationwide. In other words, 
regulatory power of the institute could be more specific and more aimed at the problems 
found in the country. Second, the national nature of the institute, to certain extent, could 
promote the competition within the nation and encourage the entry of new entrants. The 
criteria of application for the membership of the institute would be consistent nationally. 
As the membership is exclusive to those CRAs operating business in the country, the 
number of competitors faced by the new entrants would be much less when compared to 
the international competitors. In order to be fair to those domestic CRAs, those CRAs (e.g. 
Moody’s and S&P) which already have large coverage and many branches in the world 
are still required to apply for the membership of the national institute in that particular 
country so as to satisfy the particular national requirements and to put themselves under 
the particular national regulations in the country.  
 
Up to this point, one would argue that the proposition of establishing the national institute 
of CRAs might not be applicable to the regions in which no domestic CRAs operate their 
business or only major CRAs predominate, such as in Hong Kong. Under such 
circumstances, emphasis shall be put on the regulations within the region, rather than put 
on the establishment of the institute of CRAs until more and more domestic CRAs appear 
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in the credit rating industry. The “Oversight in Hong Kong” will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
c. Public Consultation 
 
Thanks to the technical committee of IOSCO, the current IOSCO code acts as the most 
comprehensive code of conduct which covers many, if not all, aspects and problems in 
credit rating industry and provides a set of codes that could be widely adopted universally. 
As discussed earlier, in light of the growing complexity of credit rating business, the 
technical committee of IOSCO shall keep abreast of the most updated situation of credit 
rating industry including pressing concerns, problems and criticisms surfaced via public 
consultation in order to amend the IOSCO code more efficiently and comprehensively. 
The process of public consultation is deemed to be of paramount importance to the 
comprehensiveness, customization, and feasibility of the IOSCO code since the market is 
the heart of the rating industry as it is the end-user of the credit ratings. Any misconduct 
of CRAs and inappropriateness and incompatibility with the IOSCO code during 
implementation could be readily detected and voiced out by the market through public 
consultation. 
 
d. Involvement of Regulatory Bodies 
 
Pursuant to the question mentioned earlier: “what level shall the regulators excise their 
regulatory power in the credit rating industry?”, it is argued that the power exercised 
by regulatory bodies shall be balanced in a way not too lax to lose control over CRAs but 
also not too stringent that is hard to conform with and may “scare away” CRAs who end 
131 
up unwilling to rate those highly risky bonds, which is consequently detrimental to the 
both the investors and the financial markets. Under such circumstances, this also explains 
the rationale behind governing the decision made by EU commission to choose the “wait 
and see” approach, rather than the other options. In parallel with my suggested proposal, 
the involvement of current regulatory bodies shall be kept more or less the same in short 
term, except the incorporation of “Institute of CRAs”, if regarded as one of the 
involvement of regulatory bodies. In long term view, the SEC, IOSCO, CESR as well as 
the Institute of CRAs from different nations shall collaboratively sit together to review 
the current credit rating industry; discuss the prevailing regulatory regime to find out any 
loopholes and improvement; evaluate the situation of compliance with the IOSCO code as 
well as the internal code of conduct; and devise possible solutions to problems discovered.  
 
7.3.4 Oversight of Credit Rating Industry in Hong Kong 
 
As mentioned earlier, the credit rating industry in Hong Kong is not as mature as that in 
the U.S. as there is no domestic CRAs, but only those major CRAs, operate their business 
in Hong Kong. Nowadays, unlike the designation of NRSRO stipulated in the Rating 
Agency Act in the US, the concept of recognition of CRAs in Hong Kong is rather 
ambiguous and not clearly defined because there is no such single ordinance in Hong 
Kong which deals specifically with the recognition and regulations of CRAs. Hence, it 
would not be applicable for Hong Kong to establish an institute of CRAs in light of the 
above reason. Instead, what shall be achieved is first to develop a mature and robust legal 
framework governing the credit rating industry in Hong Kong. As a “novice”, Hong Kong 
can take the current US regulatory framework as a good example to develop its own 
regulatory regime pragmatically. It is essential to note that the US regulatory regime in 
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credit rating industry only became robust after the enactment of the Rating Agency Act, 
and that all of the abovementioned suggestions can only be deemed effective in the 
context of Rating Agency Act. Hence, the establishment of legal framework shall be the 
top priority.  
 
Nowadays, there are two major financial regulatory bodies in Hong Kong. One is the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), while the other one is the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC). One of the major functions, governed by the Exchange Fund 
Ordinance and the Banking Ordinance, and carried out by HKMA is to promote the safety 
and stability of the Hong Kong’s banking system through the regulation of banking 
business and the supervision of authorized institutions.443 The SFC, which is somewhat 
analogous to the SEC in the US, is an independent non-governmental statutory body, 
responsible for regulating the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong. 444  It is 
suggested that both HKMA and SFC shall work collaboratively with each other in 
developing a robust credit rating legal framework tailored to Hong Kong’s financial 
climate. Formulation of a set of regulations with reference to the Rating Agency Act in 
the US, establishment of reasonable criteria for the recognition of CRAs, promotion of 
credit rating industry in Hong Kong would be the upcoming agenda of both HKMA and 
SFC in the coming future.  
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In the US, the problem of heavy regulatory reliance on the credit ratings is found. Such a 
problem can also be observed in global context due to the influence of Basel II. It is 
                                                 
443 The HKMA, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/hkma/index.htm 
444 The SFC, http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/aboutsfc/intro/intro.html 
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concluded that the reliance on external credit ratings for regulatory purpose saves costs of 
government bodies; but could also be a detriment to the normal operation of financial 
markets if ratings are neither informational nor reliable. Hence, reliance and reliability of 
credit ratings shall be balanced with cautions.  
 
The current regulatory regime is mainly governed by the Rating Agency Act and the Final 
Rule of the SEC. More recently, the EU Commission chose to adopt the “wait and see” 
approach with respect to the regulatory regime in credit rating industry. 
 
Following the review of past proposals, a modified proposal for regulatory reform is 
presented, in the aspects of (a) market-based self-regulation, (b) establishment of institute 
of CRAs, (c) public consultation, and (d) involvement of regulatory bodies. 
 
With regard to the oversight of credit rating industry in Hong Kong, it is suggested that 
both HKMA and SFC shall put the issues of regulation of credit rating industry on the 
table of discussion and develop a robust and mature credit rating legal framework in 
Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the concluding chapter, Chapter 8 summarizes all of findings and analyses discussed 
above and presents with an overview of this dissertation in a logical and comprehensible 
way. In view of the current and future regulatory regime of credit rating industry, a 
proposal with recommendations of the solutions is offered after reviewing previous 
suggestions proposed in official documentation and in individuals’ published papers. 
Furthermore, the limitation of the study is spelt out in the sense that certain areas of 
findings and analyses contained in this dissertation are limited to those acknowledged 
factors that can not or have not been solved due to the systemic factors and the scope of 
the dissertation. Last but not least, this dissertation is put to an end with suggestions of 
further research study that can be conducted in the future in order to enrich the topic of 
this dissertation with other contributive researches, including this dissertation itself. 
 
8.1 Summary of the Study 
 
On one hand, the credit rating industry has been growing in popularity alongside the 
expanding financial markets among domestic/institutional investors, portfolio managers, 
broker-dealers, debt issuers, regulators and other market participants in financial markets; 
on the other hand, such industry has been becoming notorious for the pressing problems 
surfaced, such as the conflicts of interest, lack of competition, ambiguous accountability, 
transparency and disclosure problems, lack of diligence, and incompetence. The Enron’s 
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scandal in the US tremendously stunned the people with eyes and mouth wide open, 
waking investors from the dream that credit rating is something that can always reflect the 
underlying credit worthiness of the bond issuers and that can invariably be relied on 
without doubtfulness of its credibility and accuracy. In the aftermath of Enron’s collapse, 
the failure in Worldcom in 2002 once again accumulated and brewed the voices of 
concern and criticisms over the incompetence and misconducts of CRAs. Not until the 
recent outbreak of Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the US, did people realize the seriousness 
of domino effects and the global impacts that could be generated in the context of 
globalization and call for the urgent need to cope with the agency problem timely and 
effectively.  
 
The rapid growth of the CRAs and the continuous development of the credit rating 
industry are attributed to the heavy reliance of policymakers and regulators when drafting 
and enacting the rules and regulations. With respect to the globalization of the credit 
rating industry, Basel II, a revision on the rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, 
fostered the development and the widespread use of CRAs and the credit ratings. The 
inclusion of the concept of credit ratings in the banking system and its capital requirement 
associated with the external credit ratings made CRAs and their credit ratings more 
widely recognized worldwide. Under such circumstances, the blossom of credit rating 
industry has since been further boosted by the implementation of Basel II. Another 
contributing factor to the globalization of credit rating industry stems from the NRSRO 
designation of SEC, which served as the financial regulatory agent of the US government 
to monitor and regulate the operations of market participants in financial markets, and 
also played influencing role in global financial markets. The NRSRO designation in the 
US boosted the reputation of those CRAs nationally recognized, whereby the credit rating 
136 
business of these CRAs also predominates over the same business of the others as it does 
in the US. As a result, a phenomenon of market oligopoly arises. 
 
The legal status445  of CRAs is credited to the recognition of NRSRO. The level of 
surveillance on NRSROs is more rigorous and observable, and the ascendance and 
dominance possessed by NRSROs are more remarkable when compared to non-NRSROs. 
In particular, after the enactment of the Credit Rating Rating Agency Act of 2006 which 
stipulates all the necessary requirements for the registration of NRSRO, the SEC is 
empowered to implement registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting and oversight 
rules associated with the registered CRAs. The Technical Committee of IOSCO also 
made its greatest effort to issue the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs in 2004; 
whereas the CESR published the consultation paper of “The Role of CRAs in Strutured 
Finance” in 2008 covering the issues of concerns in relation to the credit rating industry. 
However, all of the documentation mentioned above does not seem to impose significant 
constraints on CRAs, especially the compliance and the enforcement.  
 
The law court cases studied collectively indicate the difficulty in order to hold CRAs 
liable and accountable for their allegedly inaccurate credit ratings and misconducts due to 
(1) the “automatic” trigger of “actual malice” which puts onerous burden on the plaintiff 
to furnish with the genuine issues of material fact to prove that the defendant (CRA) 
made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth; (2) 
the protection of the credit ratings released (which are regarded as “public speech”) by the 
First Amendment; and (3) the court’s denial of “duty of care” owed by the CRAs with 
respect to the claim for negligent misrepresentation due to waiver of liability by CRAs’ 
                                                 
445 See supra note 22. 
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published disclaimer and the First Amendment. In light of all the abovementioned reasons, 
it is rather, if not entirely, difficult to recover damages as a result of CRAs’ misconduct 
and negligence. 
 
It is foreseen that the problems in credit rating industry are so deep-rooted and formidable 
that proposals unilaterally focusing on only one or two aspects are left doubtful of their 
efficiency and efficacy during implementation. The recommendations put forth in this 
dissertation, however, are built on other proposals in the past and are customized to aim 
to solve problems and to answer one critical question: “What level shall the regulators 
excise their regulatory power in the credit rating industry?”. The proposal of 
recommendations features four various aspects, namely market-based self-regulation, 
establishment of Institute of CRAs, public consultation, and the involvement of 
regulatory bodies. It is noted the proposed recommendations shall be implemented step 
by step in a pragmatic way of which compatibility, flexibility, and efficiency are taken 
into account in practice. Such a proposal not only intensifies the reputational pressures 
exerted on CRAs to minimize to likelihood of any misconduct carried out, but also 
establishes a link connected among regulators, CRAs, and investors in the future. 
 
Lastly, it is suggested that both HKMA and SFC in Hong Kong to lay down their own 
agenda to formulate a set of regulations with reference to the Rating Agency Act in the 
US, establish reasonable criteria for the recognition of CRAs, and promote credit rating 
industry in order to strengthen the oversight in Hong Kong. 
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8.2 Limitation of the study 
 
In light of the scope of this dissertation, only three of the five NRSROs (Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch) were studied in details. To fully understand the issues associated with 
NRSROs, all of the five NRSROs should be studied and analyzed and compared in 
respect to their organizational structure, corporate culture as well as their fee structure. 
 
In addition, due to the scope of the dissertation, five representative court cases were 
selected, and their respective legal implications were studied. In order to understand the 
rationale behind the court decisions and to obtain the whole picture of legal status446 held 
by CRAs, a large number, if not all, of court cases shall be taken into account; and their 
respective legal implications shall be summarized in the form of a table readily for 
comparison. In this regard, the entire legal picture in the context of litigation held in court 
could be manifested. 
 
8.3 Further Research Area 
 
As touched upon at the end of chapter 7, the maturity and robustness of oversight of 
credit rating industry in Hong Kong is are still far from satisfactory when compared with 
that in the US. As the demand for credit ratings in financial market in Hong Kong grows, 
it is increasingly important to strengthen the oversight in Hong Kong. Further research 
can be conducted in the area of seeking ways to develop a mature and robust credit rating 
legal framework in Hong Kong. 
 
                                                 
446 See supra note 22. 
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Moreover, as the heated topic of “Subprime Mortgage Woe” still prevails worldwide and 
certain impacts generated under such crisis are still underestimated, hidden or unknown to 
the economists and bankers, it is deemed significant to carry out further research to 
discover those hidden impacts brought about by the crisis and the derived legal 
implications and liability born by the concerning market participants. 
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